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CHAPTER I
THE EFFECTS OF MACHIAVELLIANISM ON BARGAINING
SUCCESS IN TRIADS; A PILOT STUDY
Introduction
11

Machiavellianism 11 as a definition of behavior type, is

derived from research which relies upon scales drawn from
philosophical assertions espoused by Niccolo Machiavelli in
1532; Mach scales (as they are known) measure the level of
endorsement of manipulative attitudes with regard to interpersonal
relationships.

Self-perceived manipulative attitudes are in

agreement with Machiavellian precepts concerning behavior;
hence, high scorers (by definition those who do not take an
overly social or moralistic view of themselves) behave markedly
more manipulatively than low scorers in behavioral testing
situations.

In the past two decades several constructs in which

individuals engage in social interactions which elicit
interpersonal manipulations have been developed . . . one,
the triad, lends itself especially well to small group Mach
studies.

It is the purpose of this research study to further

investigate the Machiavellian phenomenon in a triad situation
in which subjects perpetrate manipulative attempts upon one
another while engaging in a competitive activity specifically
orientated to the examination and comprehension of the

2

persuasive/manipulative techniques of exploitation.
- .. Generally stated, the main hypothesis of this pilot study
posits a significant correlation between self-reports by a
subject on the Mach IV and Mach V tests (Christie and Geis, 1970,
1968 test editions) and degree of successful manipulations/
persuasions as reflected in point score during COnfl i ct of
11

interest

11

bargaining for coalition within a triad; influencing

the distribution of point score so that "higher Machs
significantly more frequently.

11

win

Winni_ng per se is predicated

upon manipulative and persuasive abilities, formation of
coalitions, control of power

durin~

play, and awareness of

exploitative or propagandistic techniques.
General Background and Supportive Research
The triad, when designed as a three person bargaining
coalition in competition, may be likened to the Roman
Gladiatorial Triangle; exercises in forced alliances.

These

high conflict situations tend to produce a series of tenuous
and constantly changing strategic maneuvers in which are
manifested interpersonal manipulations initiated by each
bargainer at another bargainer•s expense.

Coalition

research therefore has examined how persons .choose between
alternative coalitions in situations where coalitions are
necessary for persons to attain outcomes (see Gamison, 1964;
Komorita and Chertkoff, 1973; for reviews).

Cap 1ow s ( 195 9)
1

expanded theory of coalitions in the triad, includes four

3

four- criteria for comprehension of the motivational aspects of
coalition:
1.

Members of a triad may differ in strength.
A
stronger member can control a weaker member and
will seek to do so.

2.

Each member of the triad seeks a position of
advantage with respect to each distribut i on of
rewards.
A larger share of reward is preferred
to a smaller share; any share is preferred to
no share.

3.

The strength of the coalition is equal to the
strength of its two members.

4.

The formation of coalitions takes place in an
existing triad, so there is a precoalitional
condition in every triad.

Anatol Rapoport (1960) discussing the viabi l ity of game
theory research remarked that an empirical approach to bargaining
situations through study of coalition formation seem f ull of
promise, asking whether a general (probabilistic) law can be
observed (not derived) which would assign frequency
distributions to all possible triplets?

If indeed such a

law were observed could we not derive from it a set of
reasonable postulates which govern bargaining behavior?
Taking this line of reasoning one step further, if different
population samples show different distributions of rewards can
these differences be attribut ed to different norms of bargaini ng
behavior and manipulative skill?
It is precisely this type of inquiry which promp t ed
researchers in the Social Sciences to develop experiment al
designs integrating coalition game theory and sc i en tific

]~ ~
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attitudes, lack of conventional morality,

_.19~ - ideological

commitments, and a generally cynical assessment of others have come to be known as high Machs.

Past research which

applies to the present study can be grouped according to two
broad categories:

persuasion and manipulation/exploitation

where (high) Machiavellians exhibit some very different
behaviors than (low) non-Machiavellians.
studies:

Persuasion Mach

Braginsky, 1966; Bogart, 1968; Geis, Levy and Weinheimer,

1966; Harris, 1966; Jones, Gergen and Davis, 1962; Novielli,
19 68 ; an d Ri m, 19 66 .
Christie

~nd

Man i pul at i on I e xp 1oi t at i on Mach stud i e s :

Geis, 1970; Exline, Gray and Schuette, 1965;

Geis, 1964a, 1964b, 1968; Geis, Christie and Nelson, 1970; Geis,
Weinheimer and Berger, 1966; Weinstein, Berkhouser, Blumstein
and Stein, 1968.
According to Burgoon, Heston and McCroskey (1974) "Not
only is the high Machiavellian willing to manipulate others,
he is more successful at it and enjoys it" (p. 33).
the previously cited experiments, high

t~achs

In all of

proved to be more

effective than low Machs in exhibiting the communication skills
necessary to control others.
Situational criteria relevant to establishing conditions
under which high and low Mach behavior most observably differs
include:

physical confrontation in face-to-face environment,

latitude for improvisational interpretation of response, and
available affective distraction.

6
Vinacke and Arkoff (1957) testing an ftqual power triad
developed a three person situation in which serious manipulative
attempts wet·e elicited from each player, who (in turn) attempted
to resist being manipulated by the other players.

They concluded

that equal power weights resulted in equal division of rewards.
Applying this conclusion to manipulation research, Geis (1964)
successfully developed a sophisticated "Con Game, ' the first
1

triad Mach type research based on coalition game design.

Her

results reveal a positive correlation between high Mach scores
and the successful manipulation of others.

Rapoport (1960)

describes a triad situation which was adapted by Christie and
Geis (1970 Chapter IX) into the "Ten Dollar Game," a situation
where three players split $10 between two partners, excluding
the third.

High Machs won excessively; the losers were not

randomly distributed between the Middle and Low groups, but
statistically were more apparent in the Low group.
drawn from this study suggest that

11

•••

Conclusions

winning vi a bargaining,

appears to be directly related to Machiavellianism, and losing
inversely related" (Christie and Geis, 1970, p. 166).
Various independent research conclusions reveal no
apparent differences between high and low Machs in
standardized intelligence test scores (Singer, 1964, Wrightsman
and Cook, 1965, Christie and Geis, 1970), birth rank (Newcomb,
1963), or education level; sex, race, religion or any other
demographic variable except perhaps age/population of area

7

where subjects spent most of their adolescence (Guterman, 1970).
Hence, cosmopolitanism or urbanization may be a factor inversely
relating traditionalism and Machiavellianism.
11

11

If indeed the dissimilarities between individuals (other
than Machiavellianism quotient) are insignificant, how then
does one account for the disparity observed between bargaining
success frequencies? . Conclusions concerning the '•reasons"
behind high vs. low Mach game-playing deviations have been
interpreted by Christie and Geis (1970, p. 209) as:
Manifestations of low Mach distraction by ego-irivolving
elements in the bargaining context ·, 11 or because high Machs are
better strategists because they

11

•••

act by what they know

makes them effective in exploiting whatever resources the
situation provides (including low Machs) 11 (Christie and Geis,
1970, p. 312).

Is it knowledge or manipulation and persuasion

or a proclivity for exploitation (or both) which helps to give
high Machs an advantage over lower Machs who, it is theorized,
are personally more distracted and perhaps less motivated or
perceptive?
Persuasion implies the intentional influencing of another
person to an action, belief, etc., by appealing to his reason
or emotion; while exploitation infers making

11

unethical

11

use of

someone or something to one•s own advantage · . . . both factors
combined, form a semantic composite which yields a variable,
albeit derogatory, definition of propagandizing.

8

Though much propaganda type research has been conducted,
conclusions which can be applied to Machiavellianism are
general and fragmentary.

Examini_ng specific Mach investigations

and inductively generalizing on subject propagandistic ability
is more common, but difficult to substantiate.

A notable

characteristic of past research in this vein has been the attempt
to disguise investigation of manipulative behavior or
persuasive affect, by directing the subject's attention to some
other plausible interpretation of experimental objectives.
_Hence, utilization of a context where the subjects are informed
that the experifl)ent not only deals ·with, but requires active
participation in, persuasive manipulations (i.e. propagandistic
orientation) has been limited.

In addition to contextual

disguises, most experimental methodologies refrain from
giving subjects any specific advance base of common relevant
information.

Thus the subjects are not only obliged to

accept a deceptive "smoke screen" experimental purpose, but
also to enter into that construct uninformed.

It is one thing

to conclude that high Machs, by whatever exploitative/
pe r s uas i ve me an s at the i r di s pos a1 , are ab1e to "w i n"
(perhaps by default) over low Machs in an experimental
situation which purports to be measuring something else
and quite another to support that same conclusion in a
situation where all subjects are not only informed as to the
manipulative/persuasive nature of the experiment, but also

9
have a common base of information, and are actively aware of
and participating in propagandistic assessments with
manipulative/persuasive interactions.

It is precisely to

investigate and further define the limits fo behavioral
generalizations applied to the phenomenon of Machiavellianism
vi s - a- vi s en han ce d bar ga i ni ng s ucce s s rat i os , t hat the '' The
People Mover Game' (aka PMG) was devised.
1

The research vehicle to be used in this study is a
construct which includes all of the mandatory situational
criteria to promote bargaining and operates in a setting
which explicitly investigates the n·techniques of propaqanda.

11

The PMG, whose experimental design is based upon game theory
style small group interaction, is a bargaining-coalition
triad constructed to remove any pretenses or

11

Smoke-screen''

issues from the persuasive nature of the experimental
environment.

Gallo, Funk and Levine (1969) analyzed experi-

mental environments which truly promoted reciprocity behavior
and allocated responsibility for control, concluding that for
an experimental vehicle to effectively fulfill their game
theory mandate it must be enhanced," "enriched" and provide
11

a 11 decomposed matrix" of outcomes; the PMG meets all of these
criteria.

Lastly, from a bargaining coalition standpoint

conducive to Machiavellian behavior, the PMG is three-person
(triad) small group, mixed-motive (where players have partially
common/partially opposed interests), non-zero-sum situation

10
which provides face-to-face confrontation, latitude for
distributive and integrative bargaining (improvisational elements),
and attitudinal structuring for irrelevant affect (see Walton
and McKersie, 1965).
Research Veh i c 1e; "The Game 11
From G.H. Moulds' Thinking Straighter, Allen and Green
(1966)developed The Propaganda Game as an "introduction 11 to
propagandistic tecnhiques which distort the thinking process.
This author modified The Propaganda Game into a bargaining
coalition triad format suitable

fo~

research manipulation.

From The Propaganda Game's 240 examples sub-divided into
fifty-five technique types; 60 examples were drawn, the
technique types were condensed to twenty-one and categorized
into nine distinct groups.

These groups were arbitrarily

assigned a reference number, 1-9, and a group containing
11

no technique

11

was assigned number 10.

Technique groupings:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Prejudice/ridicule
Abstraction-ambiguity-diversion
Rationalization/pity
Wishful thinking/oversimplification
Flattery-status-manner
Acceptable to the dubious/draw the line, moderatism/
radicalism
7. Practical consequences/attacking a straw man
8. Bandwagon/bargain
9. Beginning or leading the question
10. "No technique"

(See Appendix A for rules, examples, definitions, etc., given
each subject prior to participation in the People Mover Game).
Severa 1 modi fi cations of the "rules •• governing p1ay in

11
The Propaganda Game were necessary to assure that coalition
bargaining would occur, but that no coalition would be any
more likely, during play, than any other.

Though some

coalition alliance is mandatory for play to occur, specific
strategy in the P_eople Mover Game 1s left to the discretion
of each player.

Scoring is weighted:

to encourage

bargaining, to balance for risk-taking, and enhance speed
of play while penalizing hasty or impetuous judgment the
11

Controller function offers game flexibility, acting as
11

both a score/status enhancer and an impetus for non-Controllers
to form "revolutionary" coalitions · against the "Group Leader

11

(see Caplow, 1968; Michner and Lyons, 1972; and Lawler, 1975)
Therefore, bargaining participation by any player in any
coalition is based on at least one of three assumptions:
I)

Maximum advantage/minimum disadvantage of
strength relative to coalition partner(s).

II)

Maximize strength of the coalitinn in relation
to the excluded triad member.

III) Avoidance (of either exclusion or inclusion
depending upon specific strategic decisions
made by any player).
Statement of Pilot Study Hypotheses
To summarize thus far, Machiavellianism generally should
correlate with successful manipulation during conflict of
interest bargaining coalitions with a triad, reflected in
point score and win-loss ratios.

By inference, supported by

past research, successful bargaining is predicted upon

12
maDiP~lative

and persuasive communication abilit i es, formation

of coalitions, control of power, judgment or leadership, awareness of exp l oi tati ve

o ·~

propagandistic techniques and

concentration on the conflict resolution or goal without
becoming distracted by the processes which lead to that
resolution.
The above stated assumptions combined with evide nce
· supported by past reseach yielded severa.1 t es t abl e
predictions:
1.

High Machs will win more points than low Machs ,
even though the game is structured for equ alization among all subjects.

2.

Use of the power position of 11 Controller 11
will be more prevalent among high Machs ,
even though that position is equally
available to all pl ayers.

3.

High Machs will participate in a greater
number of stable coalitions.

4.

High Machs will make significantly more
Plea Bargains, than either middle or low
machs, because that variable is more readily
manipulated, and will opt for any point
score over none.

(Post hoc analysis of pilot study data revealed a combination or
interaction of predictions 2, 3, and 4 such that the balance

.

of power position/play (i.e. controller/bold challenge,
coalition for majority, and plea bargaining) be more ab ly
controlled to optimum advantage of a player in proport i on to
the strength of his Machiavellianism Quot i ent) .

13

Methodology
The selection of subjects ·was accomplished by administration
of the Mach IV test (7 point bipolar Likert-type scale; 20 X
item mean + 20) and the Mach V test (forced choice, 20 question
most/least weighted score + 20, 1968 edition) as contained
in Christie and Geis (1970) (see Appendix B), to thirty-seven
(37) subjects; fifteen (15) females and twenty-two (22) males,

aged 19-56.

After the scores were tabulated, it was obvious

that initial intent to group subjects into high, middle and low
groupings by quartile distribution (i.e. 40-70 = #1, 70-100 =
#2, 100-130

= #3,

130-160

= #4)

for each test, choosing 4/4 or

4/3 as high; 1/1 or 1/2 as low; and the remainder as middle
. . . would have yielded only two low Machs and one high Mach.
This resulted in an immediate modification of the grouping
procedure prior to conducting the experiment.

The criteria

used to establish Mach grouping was to accumulate the scores
of both tests using 210 as the median, 30 points = Z (one
standard deviation); hence:

high Mach scores were greater

than or equal to 240, low Machs were less than or equal to
180, and middle Machs scored between 181-239.
The selection of five triads with one high, one middle
and one low Mach in each resulted in comparisons being drawn
from 15 subjects, all subjects being randomly assigned to groups.

14
Procedure
All subjects were given full formal instructions in the
form of a hand-out (see rules, Appendix A) and alloted 10-15
minutes of individual study before engaging in a verbal recap
of game procedures, expectations, and purposes, to minimize
subject disorientation and establish a common base of knowledge.
All subjects were given the information that in order to score
points some sort of coalition must be formed during each
11

reading," however no subject was required to join one if

he chose not to do so.
Each reading constitvted a new condition subject to no
restrictions from any previous coalitions, and that each
participant was to accrue as many points as possible per
reading; maximizing scoring to its full potential (i.e. winning)
without regard to the other players.

One trial reading was

conducted to acquaint subjects with the "feel 11 of the game,
after which any final questions were answered.
The scoreboard was a three foot high X one foot wide
vertical simple linear scale, from -5 to +21 inclusive.
This scale was divided vertically into equal thirds, with each
of the three subjects per triad having one column designated
by his name written in at the

11

Zero" space.

The order from

left to right was alternated from game to game, so that no
Mach group's subjects were assigned to a specific board
.+.

pOSlt.lOn.

The subjects sat within arms length of one

another facing each other and the control block (a standard

15
2 x 6 chalk board eraser) was centered among
them.
The
--experimenter read each selection chosen at random from the 60
11

11

possible choices.
was granted.

If a

re·.~eadi . ng ·

was requested, the request

Readings continued and points accumulated

until one (or more, if simultaneously) advanced across the +21
mark to WIN, at which point the game was officially declared
over.

(None of the experimental runs exceeded 20 reading

selections before sufficient points were accumulated to
produce a winner).
Results of the Pilot Study
As shown in Table 1, by summing the individual scores
together, a cumulative total score is derived which, when
calculated against the expected value of 69.67 for each
Mach group (i.e. 33.33% of the total, each group should
receive one third of the points/rewards), a Chi-Square
reveals significance in support of the main hypothesis
beyond the .01 percent confidence level (x 2 = 12.12 df 2 p<.Ol).

16

Table 1
PILOT STUDY; CHI-SQUARE COMPARISON OF BARGAINING
SUCCESS AS A FUNCTION OF MACHIAVELLIANISM

Sum Totals

% Tot a1

High

91/209

43.54%

21.31
(10.21%)

Middle

68/209

32.53%

-1.69
(- . . 80%)

Low

50/209

23.92%

19.69
( "9 ..41%)

Mach Group

Fo-Fe

In an attempt to further evaluate the relationship between
the Mach test scores and successful point score in the PMG, a
Pearson "r" was calculated for all subjects, yielding a
correlation coefficient of .67 (hypothesis accepted beyond
the .01 confidence level).

This correlation compares

favorably with the .71 correlation between subjects• scores
on the Mach V and the Mach IV tests.

Again using the

technique of accumulating individual scores into high, middle
and 1ow Mach composite scores a Pears on "r was ca 1cul ated
11

between group Mach test sum totals and cumulative total
points scored in

11

The Peop 1e Mover Game" by each group .

yielding correlation of .99 (significant beyond .05 confidence
le ve 1).

Strictly speaking, this correlation is based on a

rather arbitrary scale; hence, .99, while perhaps indicating
that by high, middle and low groups,

11

Mach-ness" and success

17
rate in

--

11

The Peop 1e Mover Game" · go hand in hand - exactly how

profound a revelation this relationship is, may be rather
difficult to assess.
Examination of the correlation · coefficient calculated
between the differences in Mach scores and point scores
within each triad for all conditions yielded r = .57 significant
beyond the .05 level of confidence in support of the main
hypothesis.
To further substantiate this correlation without using
Pearson's product-moment principle, Kendall's Tau formula
for use with tied ranks produced Tau= .61 (p<.Ol).

The

hypothesis that Mach score and game score would be related
is clearly confirmed.
Power Strategy
As shown in Table 2, no Mach classification significantly
opted for the Controller position more often than did any
other classification.

However, low Machs appeared to be more

restrained - tending to seek the position slightly more often
than either highs or lows.

The actual results of how often

the Controllers were correct is not particularly relevant,
because only in the "Bold Challenge
tested in the game situation.

11

mode would this be

Analysis of correct responses

reveals no indication that the efficacy ratio of initial
responses was greater for one group than another (one way
ANOVA yielded N.S.D. p<.20).

There is an interesting

18
Table 2
PI LOT STUDY; . RAW SCORE GROUP COMPARISONS
FOR GAME STRATEGY FREQUENCY

Plea Bargain
Made Accepted

.coalition

Mach Group

Controller

High

1.§.-3. 2/ garre
37%

5

4

20-4/game

Middle

18-3.6/ game
40%

8

5

~-4.4/game

Low

JQ-2/game
23%

4

2

Jl-3.4/game

Mach Group

Bold Challenge

Correct BC

Incorrect BC

High

8-1.6/game

7

1

Middle

9-1.8/game

6

3

Low

7-1.4/game

4

3

Mach Group

Advance

Sum Tot a 1

Ratio

Penalty-Points

High

113

95/105

86.6%

-22

Middle

104

68/105

64.7%

-36

86

50/105

47 . 6 ~

-36

Low

19
phenomenon, however, which suggests that the higher Machs
may use the Controller position . to coax bargaining for
coalition among the other players and then boldly challenge
their majority to secure the optimum point count possible.
This strategy occurred a total of four times (in three of five
trials), once by a middle Mach and three times by high Machs.
Insufficient data exists at this point in time to claim this
strategy supports the second prediction; quite frankly, in
retrospect, "The People Mover Game 11 is not constructed · in
such a manner as to distinguish between points gained in
power position (i.e.Controller) and points gained in power
play (i.e. Plea Bargain or Bold Challenge).
Examination of power play strategy

reveals ~

contrary to

what was expected in prediction #4, high Machs did not make
more plea bargains, only more successful ones.

Completing

80% of those attempted, being refused only once in all
trials, Table 2 shows that while the middle Mach group used
Plea Bargain option most, they had less success than high
Machs, completing slightly over 60% of their attempts.

Low

Machs made least use of the Plea Bargain, rejected as often as
accepted.

However, to a great extent low Machs were

responsible for swaying their partners to accept the pleas
made by the non-coalition member.

In terms of persuasive

ability, low Machs in this condition avoided carrying the
plea to the Reader, promoting the acceptance of the bargain

20

in

11 - o~

the 13 instances and successfully accomplishing this

end in at least 8 successful

bargains~

The unsuccessful

Plea Bargains were rejected by pressure from high Machs
in 4 of the 5 cases.

Middle Mach rejection accounted for

one unsuccessful low Mach attempted Plea Bargain, and low
Mach rejection accounted for the one unsuccessful high Mach
attempt.
It is interesting to note that of 17 Plea Bargain attempts,
in all but one case, the

11

Correcti 1 decision was made to accept

or reject the Plea Bargain, not that accepted Plea Bargainers
were more often correct, but rather, if the plea had been
carried to the Readers, all players would suffer penalty
points.

These results suggest that the Plea Bargain condition
.•

is actually less readily manipulated than had been initially
predicted.

While anticipated Machiavellian bargaining

success did occur, it is certainly as much a function of
lower Mach intra-coalition persuasive amenabilities as it is
of higher Mach persuasive manipulations.
Perhaps the most revealing indicator of differences between
Mach levels, are the results obtained from Bold Challenge
tabulations, which provide an inpex representative of
balances between risk, knowledge and willingness to manipulate.
As was anticipated, there was a lack of significant difference
between groups concerning use of the Bold Challenge, only
slight motivational differences occurred as indicated by

21

frequency _of--use and this was manifested in the middle Mach
group.

Mach group efficacy ratios in regard to Bold Challenge

reaffirms support of the hypothesis that ability rather than
motivation is the key variable.
A Chi-square was calculated to determine the likelihood
of the departure of the observed distribution from its
expected frequency, the resulting probability is beyond the
.01 confidence level (X 2 = 13.80 df = 2 p<.Ol).
This power
factor was responsible for clearly distributing the Machs
into their predicted categories, not so much as a direct
tool for point gain (though the better manipulators
11

11

applied it strategically) but as a double-edged sword, separ ating
its wielders, based on ability, into distinct categories.
Discussion
Durkin (1967) posited that high and low Machs acquire
knowledge ·of the world in two significantly different modes "an a1yt i c and
11

11

an a1og.

11

This presumes that some cognitive

dichotomy exists such that internalization of new material"
11

is programmed into an individual's field of reference as a
combination of gut or emotional cognitions (i.e. analog)
and/or intellectual or symbolic cogn i tions (i.e. analytic ) .
Durkin further suggested that while the "same 11 communicati on
may· be available to two individuals, the degree to which each
individually perceives it, may be rather dependent upon his
personal analytical or analogesque orientation.

This
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relations~~p,_

accordi_ng to "encounter theory,'' is why during

bargaining low Machs get · "_ego-distracted;" by "opening up"
and relating to other persons, hence they actually get
carried away by the other's influence.

During bargaining

high Machs send out their cognitions to communicate on a
detached analytic level, never leaving the integrity of
their cognitive framework.
Tab 1e 3

PILOT STUDY; MACH GROUP EFFICIENCY SUMMARY

Mach Group

Completed Answers

# Correct

# Incorrect

High

87% 69 of 79

54

15

Middle

95% 75 of 79

54

21

Low

90% 71 of 79

52
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The encounter-theory may have some validity, but the pattern
of responses in "The People Mover Game" shows a generally equal
tendency for all subjects in this face-to-face communication
situation to appear to one another as potential all i es ,
while perpetrating approximately the same number of manip ulative /
persuasive attempts upon one another regardless of Mach l eve l .
How then does one account for the disparity in scores ?

23
1)

Table 3 reveals there to be no major differences
tn- ·actua 1 percentage of 11 correct" responses.

2)

Efficacy ratios for each Mach category differed
less than 12% between extremes (high to middle).

3)

Coalition frequency (Table 2) was only a minor
factor slightly in favor of middle Machs which, by the way, was slightly contrary to
expectation, but again this study was conducted
with only a very limited sample).

4)

Timing" was balanced by constructing the PMG
in such a way as to virtually eliminate any
contaminating effects carried along between
or among players.
Warm up runs were included
to attempt to compensate for the possible
novelty adjustment period before actual play.
There is a slim possibility that some physiological differences in recall time or reflexreaction time could exist between players, but
the chance of that being a function of higher
Machiavellianism Quotient seems rather unlikely.

5)

Education or background, was generally equated
within each triad. All p1ayers received their
instructions and base material prior to playing
the game, and all had to identify their grade
point averages to assure relative group homogenity.

6)

Sex or some other demographic independent variable
cannot account for all the point score differences;
however, there was a consensus among females tested
that the Mach tests used were dated, sexist, and
11
required" a woman to answer as if she were a man.
This became an obvious problem early in the study,
hence attempts to group triads with same-sexed
individuals.

11

Typical PMG play reveals the

11

disadvantaged" lowest are

not, as one might expect, helpless, but rather are taken
unaware.

The next higher Mach, often the most active and

certainly one of the most powerful players, presses for
advantage too impetuously, succumbing less to the inherent
superiority of his opponents than to his own judgmental errors.
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By this

sa~ _ token,

the more successful and powerful high Mach

players are aggressive but cautious, appealing to the
'sensibilities• of their opponents while constantly (almost
relentlessly) seeking the advantage.

Without intending to

sound melodramatic, high Machs almost "mesmerize" others
into committing some concentration shift where inadvertent
blundering, the factor between winning and not winning,
decides the outcome of the game in favor of the highest Mach.
The results of this pilot study clearly point to the
importance of future research analysis to examine in greater
detai 1 exactly how well

11

Machness" and manipulation/persuasion

game skills correlate over a broader population, in attempt
to further refine those factors responsible for high or low
success ratios.

Findings in the present study are not

completely consistent with interpretations of the results
gleaned in past research.

The effects that have heretofore

been attributed to "manipulative high Machs, or "humanistic
11

11

low Machs, may need reassessment.
Contrary to previous interpretations, based on observation
of the interactions and interpersonal communication within the
triads, it is reasonable to suggest that high Machs are aware
of the personality and individuality of others.

With a minimal

amount of probing, the high Mach can accurately assess not
only another•s "weakness, .. but instigate impromptu interacti ons
to facilitate attainment of his specific goals.

Lower Machs
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appear to

~e_

..as aggressive, competitive and no more or less

ingenuous, but while the high Mach strives in a goal oriented
manner, the low Mach engages in the process of interaction,
hence an apparent product vs. process dichotomy.

CHAPTER II
EXPANDING UPON THE PILOT STUDY
It can be argued that virtually all communication is persuasion,
however, for the purposes of this thesis it is sufficient to recognize
tha t a substantial percentage of communication is specifically
i ntended to persuade.

As defined by Bettinghaus (1968) communica-

ti on devoted to persuasive intent is, " ... a conscious attempt by one
individual or group of individuals to change the behavior of another
ind ividual or group of individuals through the transmission of some
message" (p.13).

It was Tedeschi, Schlenker and Bonoma (1973)

however, who pointed out the
ma nipulation.
11

differen~e

between persuasion and

Using their definition, manipulations are;

Influence attempts in which the source tries to disguise or hide

f rom the target the influence nature of the relationship" (p.234).
This implies shrewd use of influence for one's own purposes or profit
at another's expense without the other's knowledge of that use, a
subtle but distinct

differenc~

from. Bettinghaus' definition.

Examining the bargaining proces·s from a classical game theory
perspective Nash (1950) defines bargaining as;

''A non-zero-sum game

that allows players to employ explicit communications and to make
binding agreements ... over one or more issued in attempt to arrive
at a jointly acceptable solution" (p. 129).
26

Adding to this definition
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an explanation -.of- coalition behavior drawn from. Tedeschi etal.(1973)
which" ... involves the formulation of groups whose intention is to
use mutual . resources to accomplish some common · goal in . a mixed- motive
situation 11 (p. 155);

one arrives at a working definition for bargain-

ing-coalition.
While no distinct solution to mixed-motive bargaining is
apparent, there are certainly a myriad of resolutions.

Thus, while

"outcome 11 is relative to solution, hence often specifiable prior to
the bargaining;
take many forms.

the actual outcome of a particular resolution may
These forms can be classed into several identifi-

able ·methods or strategies which typify the "style" of bargaining
used by different individuals.

If an individual wishes to reach an

agreement in which he receives a larger portion of the outcomes than
his opponennts he must adopt a "competitive" strategy which increases
his usable power, which in turn directly affects the opponents
behavior resulting in a shift in outcome.

A bargainer must implement

his power cleverly or his opponent will mobilize counterpower,
preventing the action from achieving its intended effect.

How the

fulcrum of this balance is shifted by virtue of one's Machiavellianism
quotient, and more precisely, the limits of the effects of this
variable relative to bargaining success is the purpose of this thesis.
Coalition in Triads; The Bargaining Process
Who enters into coalition and why?
be excluded from the coalition?
among coalition members?

What determines who shall

How will the outcomes be distributed

What alternative coalition possibilities
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are available to participants?

Questions such as these have

stimulated research on the processes, communication, decisions, and
behavior involved in the formation and stability of groups whose
intention is to use mutual resources, in a mixed motive situation,
to achieve specific goals on outcomes.
The importance of bargaining for coalition can easily be discerned
si mply be examin i ng historic texts and observing how often such unions
mo t ivated the political, social and economic forces which sealed the
fa t e of nations.

As an area of specific interest to researchers in

the social services, formal analysis of coalition was begun as early
as t he · turn of the century (Simmel, 1902) but not until recently
has major investigation into variable whi 0h affect coalition formation
been undertaken.
Caplow•s (1959) research, mentioned previously in the pilot study
revealed three distinctly different conditions under which the
pro cesses of coalition were affected:

1)

Continuous, where the

coalition controls the activities/rewards of the participants across
several situations or trials;

2)

Episodic, where coalitions are

fo rmed for the purpose of periodically controlling group outcomes
over extended periods of time;

and 3)

Terminal, when the purpose

of the coalition is to dissolve the group and redistribute power.
These three conditions in turn are dependent on variables which ro ughly
ca n be broken into two categories - A)

those which impact on mat erial

r esources or capabilities of the participants, and B)

those wh ic h

ar ise from interpersonal factors and interactions which affec t t he
distribution of rewards of outcomes.

Category A) type var i abl es
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are of major concern to researchers whose work focuses on the
structural and/or material aspects of coalition.

Category B)

variables, on the other hand, are of import to researchers investigating status, norms of "fair play", persuasibility, and manipulat i on as personality factors which influence coalition formation.
Ca tegory A)
va l ue theory;

research includes the work of:

Shapley (1953) in

Caplow (1956, 1959) initial distribution of power

an d logical allocation of rewards;

Vinacke and Arkoff (1957) game

theory interpretation of coalition frequency;

Harsanyi (1963)

who extended Shapley's model to determine the allocation of rewards
wi t hin · a single bargaining game;

Gameson (1964) pivotal power,

in version effect of minimum power concept, and the minimal resource
theory;

Adams (1963) parity norms and equity principles;

(1966, 1971) development of minimum resource theory;

Chertkoff

Vinacke,

Crowell, Dien and Young (1966) information as a resource;

Caldwell

(1972) amoutn of individual resource vs. desire to join coalition;
Komorita and Chertkoff (1973) alternative coalitions;

and Lawler

(1975) radical coalitions.
Category B) research includes:

Vinacke and a multitude of

ass ociates (e.g. Amidjaja and Vinacke, 1965;
Uesugi and Vinacke, 1963;

Bond and Vinacke, 1961;

Vinacke, 1959, 1962) investigation of

exp l oitative and accommodative orientations to maximization of outc omes ,
mal e vs. female strategies during bargaining, and attraction eff ect ;
Kel l y and Arrowood (1960) focus, confusion and affection relati ve to
ra ndom coalition formation;

Gamson (1964) confusion and distract i on

30

theory;

Anderson (1967) status differences and the impact of

evaluation or esteem upon coalition formation;
(1969, 1970a, 1970b) reciprocation,
t heory;

Ofshe and Ofshe

choice and the stable state

Cherkoff (1971) information and manipulation;

and Tedeschi,

Schlenker and Sonoma (1973) subjective expected utility theory of
coalition.
Most of the theories and experimental findings listed above
ha ve been drawn from situations wherein any coalition which forms
automatically wins.

This fact alone casts doubt on any broad

generalization from experimental environment to real life situations
be ca us~

seldom is it certain that merely forming a coalition

gua rantees success in bargaining.
nhances the probability of
as a group.

grea~er

Rather, a coalition only
success for its memebers viewd

Since each individual participant in mixed-motive

bargaining has his own outcome at stake, often what might be advantageous to the majority of the members in coalition may actually be
less beneficial to a specific individual.

Hence each participant

examines the expected values of all coalitional possibilities availab le to him.

He then balances this against his lone potential out-

come and then determines what he can expect as the maximum outcome
and attempt to implement it;

herein lies the crux of bargaining

str ategy.
In demand-for-consensus situations such as the experimental
env ironment in this study, to effectively negotiate a bargain means
to pursue the dual, usually contradictory goals of

m~ximizing

one's

own payoff and reaching some kind of group agreement in coalition.
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Therefore, the situation itself must be viewed as a process through
which · various individual interests are gradually transformed into an
acceptable coaliton.
Lack of broad integrating theories and penchant to concentrate
upon single processes (e.g. counter attitudinal advocacy, cognitive
di ssonance, etc.) deter communication researchers within the social
sciences from developing universal (or for that matter, even shared)
def initions.

Reviewing the existing volume of methodological

experimental research into the communication of cooperation and
conflict, one notes that the number of studies examining personality
va ri ab1es are quite obviously in the minority.

Though there are

certainly many explanations for this facti two of the most prominent
~t ern

from a) ·beJief that personality effects are too ephemeral,
/

affecting communication and behavior in some situations, but not
others, and b) that testing hypotheses about particular personality
t ypes requires extensive personality pretest administration to large
gro ups of subject, from whose ranks emerge a select few of those
i nd ividuals possessing those qualities which exemplify the relevant
per sonality variable.

I submit that these, and all other rationale

fo r avoiding further investigation into the study of personality
ffects are insufficient;

and further, contend that if we are to

adeq uately comprehend - much less, develop a comprehensive theory of communication during bargaining relative to cooperation/conflict
beha vior, personality variables must be included.

Communication

res earch which generalizes from the experimental environment t o
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broader public domains always includes sufficient variance among
i ndividuals to infer that significant influence derived solely from
differences in

is expected upon the outcomes.

person~lity

th e outcomes or stakes in

11

Granted

real life 11 interactions are functions of

t he value systems and motives of the participants, andthe complexity
of the 11 games 11 . being played vary with cognitive styles of the players.
A major characteristic of situations. which attempt to resolve
conflict that makes them especia11y vulnerable to the idiosyncracies
of personality variables, is the fact that intentions underlying
particular actions are seldom obvious.

Hence, an ostensibly

cooperative communication may either be genuine or rather an attempt
t o l ure another person into a position more susceptible to manipulation.
Conversely, the uncooperative communication
aggr essive or defensive in

intent~

m~y

also be either

Coupling these factors with

t he cogniti ve styles of the indivudals it is possible, for example,
t o have three persons in conflict:

one disposed toward cognitive

simplicity who perceives the possible stakes only as victory or
defeat and all other individuals as opponents to be beaten;

the

econd person may be cognitively complex, seeing the other players
not so much as opponents. but as potentia 1 partners to be won over:
f inally the third participant, a cognitively multiplEx individual
erceives a range of outcomes in which through some compromise an
optimal solution is possible.

Given such ambiguities, interpreta-

tio n of one individual's actions by another is, to some major ex t ent,
a fu nction of the latter's predispositions and personality vari ab les among them Machiavellianism.
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Yet, it is naive to assume that the utility functions reflected by
point score are representative indices of the motivations in which
are manifested the subject's personality.

lienee, one indivi ,jual

(high Mach) may experience maximum utility and satisfaction by "outwitting" his opponents, while another (low Mach) may experience
maximum utility and satisfaction when he perceives during interaction
t hat his opponents are contented by achieving a slightly inequitable
di stribution of rewards, the cost of which is unimportant, as the
"real" issue is the complexity of the interaction.
Va riables
Once the conditions. of the construct have been outlined, there
ar i ses the task of manipulating elements inherent within these
pa rameters to test the limits of Machiavellian influence.
/

et al. (1974) suggests;

Burgoon

"If in a group, you are attempting to

mi nimize the influence of a high Mach, one of the few things you
can do is de-emphasize the task ... '' ( p. 44).

Hemphill (1961)

in vestigating verbal reinforcement, concluded that experimenter
pos itive reinforcment and emphasis on subject participation
significantly increased the frequency of those subjects to attempt
leadership in the group.

The suggests that perhaps the "irrelevant

affe ct" which emotionally distracts i. ow Machs may be behaviorally
modified by simple reinforcement of, and additional emphasis on,
pa rticipatory leadership-information-concentration behavior.
From a bargaining perspective Tedeschi et al. (1973) suggests
promotion of the power inversion effect, where, predicated on the
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knowledge that bargaining strengths may differ between players,
weaker group members form coalitions against stronger group members.
~ T h is

is similar to Lawler's *1975) study of factors affecting the

mob ilization of 'revolutionary' coaliti'ons .
aga inst the

11

This promotes coalitions

Stronger" high Mach, by the less strong low Machs -

causing the stronger player to lose more and the weaker players to
wi n more control;

hence, weakness is strength.

Machiavellianism generally correlates with successful mani pula ti on
du ri ng mixed-motive conflict of interest bargaining coalitions wi t hin
By inference, supported by

a t r iad, reflected in outcome ratios.
past

re~earch,

successful bargaining is predicated upon manipula tive

nd persuasive communication abilities, formation of coal i t i ons,
-ont rol of power, judgment and/or leadership, awareness of exploi t ati ve or propagandist i c . techniques and co·ncentra ti on on the conflict
resolution or goal without becoming distracted by the processes
whi ch lead to that resolution.

In this thesis, two additional

va r i ables are to be introduced:

1)

emphasis on the need for all

laye.rs to. concentrate on the task at hand, and partial disclosure
of t he nature of Machiavellianism;

as well as 2)

full disclosure

of t he general characteristics of the Machiavellian personality
including the actual Machiavellianism Quotient of each subj ect in

.

the bargaining triad, to all triad members.
Statement of Hypothesis
Main:

High Machs are more successful than low Machs i n mixed-

motive bargaining coalition situations.

Much of this success will
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be attributed to

th~ir

superior manipulative abilities, lack of

emphasis on conventional ethical standards, and a detached approach
to interpersonal functioning.

Until such time as Machiavellianism

Quotient disclosure reveals his true nature, a participant will
control the balance of bargaining power, both in l eadership and
j udgment, to his advantage in proportion to his Machiavellianism
Quotient.

Disclosure of the Nature of Machiavel lianism's emphas i s

on task orientation, and particularly the impact of revealing each
i ndividual's Machiavellianism Quotient to all members of th e
bargaining triad will negate any innate or acquired super i or
manipulative skill possessed by a member· Machiavel lian.
This thesis posits that the effects of Machiavelliani sm on
bargaining success in mixed-motive coalition triads will be limited
by 1)

personally labeling Machiavellian individual s as manipulators

t o the other triad members, and to a lesser extent 2)

by stress ing

t he need for all participants to concentrate on t he bargaining task
wi thout considerati·on for the outcomes of any other player.
Testable Research Predictions
#1) In the base condition (i.e. condition .1) high Mac hs will
successfully out bargain lower Machs and receive a si gnificant
and disproportionally large share of the outcomes, whi ch will
result in high Machs winning more games.
#2) When all subjects are specifically instructed to concentrate
on optimizing the bargaining task to overcome t he inf luence of
a skilled Machiavellian manipulator in their midst;

high Machs
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will win somewhat more points than low Machs, but the margin . of
---

difference will not be as profound as in research prediction #1.
#3)

Full disclosure of the nature of Machiavellianism, coupled with
revelation of the Machiavellianism Quotient of each participant,
should effectively equalize and limit any effects on bargaining
due to Machiavellianism..

Hence, no statistically significant

score disparity among participants will occur.
#4)

The balance of power strategies (i.e. bold challenge and coa li tion
for majority) will be mo.re ably controlled to optimum advan tage
of a player in proportion to the strength of his Machiavel lia nism
Quotient only so long as that Mach Quotient is not known t o his
opponents.

Operationalization
Condition 1.

Eight triads (n=24)

Establishment of basic homogeneous bargaining-coalition triads
consisting of one each high, middle and low Mach males;

where

each individual's purpose is to accrue the maximal point score
per reading, with the goal being a "win" of 20 total points .
· The gains are accomplished by establishing the identity (by
type #) of various
propaganda.

manipulative-persu~sive

techniques of

Subjects score either by, majority consensus or

via an individual direct challenge of the "correctness" of a
majority•s decision.

Subjects will be provided with a common

base of specific information regarding point score and classification of propagandistic techniques.

All subjects wil l be
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informed prior to the actual participation that the rules of
the game are designed to promote and encourage individual
development of strategic tactics.
Condition 2.

Eight triads (n=24)

Bargaining groups are as identical as possible to those composed
in Condition 1.;

with additional emphasis placed on the

necessity for each individual to apply himself to the barga i ning
task, accumulating as many points as possible for himsel f wi t hou t
regard for any other player's outcomes.

Plus a pregame

explanation about manipulation, Machiavellianism, and r evel ation
of the fact that one such Machiavel is a member of each bargaining
triad.
Condition 3.

Eight triads (n=24)

Identical in composition to Conditions 1. and 2. with the
inclusion of additional pregame information promoting poss i bl e
inversion effects.

This explanation will emphasize t he

importance of each individual's concentration on the task, th e
nature of Machiavellianism, and the group identification of each
participant's Machiavellianism Quotient.

CHAPTER III

STRUCTURE, PURPOSE -AND IMPLEMENTATION
Game Theory and Communication.
In any bargaining in coalition game situation, one participant
or group seeks to gain compliance from another participant or group.
In such situations lines of communication and behavior are established
i n an attempt ·to get another to comply in a manner advantageous to the
manipulator, even though the target individual is apt to respond
unpredictably.

The perpetrator of manipulation, if he is to

accomplish hi-s ends, must then counteract the moves of those from
whom he seeks compliance by a variety of direct or subtle deflecting
maneuvers.

It is precisely these maneuvers which, when observed in

con tinuum, reveal a manipulator's strategic and exploitative skills.
The problems of communication, trust, s.uspicion and temptation
whic h accompany mixed-motive bargaining provide a wealth of
opportunity for the imaginative manipulator to exercise various aspec ts
of his strategy.

It follows that winning strategies are successfu l

attempts to implement an agreement which convinces the other
part icipant(s) that the best manipulator should receive a greater
port ion of the total outcomes than they.

To do this, a bargainer

must implement any power he possesses, or he can attempt to dis tor t
his partner's and opponent's perception of the actual nature of the
power relationship.
38
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Generally, the mixed-motive bargaining situation utilized as
t he experimental environment of this study begins conflict with one
participant attempting to establi.sh a controlling structure within
t he triad from whi.ch compliance to his . intentions is. a normal'' or
11

"l egitimate 11 consequence.

His control may be countermanded by

several contradictory course of action introduced by either one
or both of his potential controllee, or the latter may accept the
overall structure as suggested by the controller and erstwhile
mani pulator, but redefine some specific elements of the bargain
pr ior to coalition, this modifying the outcomes in his behalf;
i n essence perpetrating a countermanipulation upon the individual
i n control.

In response to this counteroffer the controller must

either insist on his original course of action, attempt to direct
the impetus of his bargaining to only one of the two .potential
m ni pulatees establishing a dyadic union which also elicits maximum
payoffs for himself, utilize elements of his opponent's presentation
or t hie own exploitative value, challenge via threat of punishment
ny

other coalition or course of action suggested by his opponents

hi ch would reduce his own outcomes below his minimum acceptable
li mit , or succumb to the will of a superior manipulator and accept
ny

form of counter proposal lest he be excluded from the coalition

.

ntirely, thus receiving no outcome at all.

Usualiy the structure of communication during bargaining is
constructed in phases.
i s accepted or thwarted;
or withdrawn;

The first offer is introduced and immediatel y
the offer is either re-introduced,. modified

any new offer introduced is either accepted or thwarted
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and so on.

Each game consists of numerous rounds and each round in

turn may be composed of several offers and counter offers.

The round

ends when:. the controller succeeds in keeping his power; when the
intended manipulatee has avoided or evaded the controller•s frame
of compliance, opting for some other course of co-alition action;
when there is a. standoff;

when any participant demands a bold

challenge breaking off any further bargaining;

or when al l members

of the triad accept unanimous plea bargain accepting the minimum
positive outcome over none or negative outcomes..

The game ends

when the most skilled manipulator(s) has triumphed over hi s
adversaries successfully achieving the required point score terminating
additional rounds.
Speaking in

~road

terms, participants identify t he "pur pose" of

the game in play, although not usually

i~

terms of specific strategies

by establishing communication among one another in order to become
cognizant of the individual goals each has chosen.
what is meant by game theory rationale.

This is, presumably,

Awareness that the other

participants have individual goals, as evidenced by their respective
l i nes of action and the varied but finite means available through which
t o realize them, defines the preliminary parameters necessary for
ba rgaining interaction.

In a sense the mandatory nature of this

understanding is a meta-communication in and of itself by virtue of
fa ct that absence of same constitutes the principal condi t ion under
whi ch bargaining cannot proceed.

Hence, once participan t s have

defined the structure of the barqaininq situation, they beg in to
i nterpret the symmetrical or complementary understandings which tacitly
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establish the motivation for coalition, negotiation and strategic
-~

--

manipulation - all .of which are based upon the crucial aspect of
mutural agreement.
One area in which the present study differs from the more
mathematical models of game behavior is the shift of emphasis from
perfect (zero

s~m)

information to a condition of intentionally

ambiguous and imperfect information (mixed-motive) wherein the
players have i.n genera 1, partially-common/partially-opposed
i nterests.

It is exactly this imperfect information feature which

should enhance generalizability from the findings of this study to
the imperfect information conditions which characterize bargaining
i n real life social situation.

Rather than constrict ingenuity,

i ndependent action, or novel communication strategies, this game
esign provides the participants with a stressful environment which
eli cits anxious concern over numerous face-to-face stratigic
decisions and adds incentive for individuals so inclined to directly
an tral the situations - so long as some form of coalition exists
between or among the players contro1led.

Exercising this game

f r amework within conditions which differ in regard to task orienta t t io n and personality variable disclosure should provide a rough
"yardstick

11

to measure the limits of the effects of the Machieavellian

per sonality upon bargaining success in triads.
There are those critics of bargaining and associated game
fr ameworks who object to manipulation/persuasion studies of t hi s
type because Machiavellianism Quotient, achievment orientation,
dominance, etc., pre-suppose participants to be to some greater or
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lesser degree, basically immoral and essentially opportunistic.
In response, I contend, that it is not that bargaining pre-supposes
any particular morality;

rather, in the mode of game framework,

bargaining indicates that personality variable both affect and effect
bargaining outcomes and such enhanced skill has advantageous rewards.
Amoral and adept manipulators are simply one of a variety of traits
manifested within several personality types, which for some are seen
as ne'er-do-wells, for others, role models.

This study proposes

t o assist humanistic communication researchers in their unders tandi ng
of those elements which mig·h t assist moral man in immoral society,
and for those opportunists less concerned with the fate of manki nd,
vi ce versa.
Met hodology
Subject selection was accomplsiehd by administration of the Mac h IV
t est (7 point Likert-type scale;
1970, p. 17;

cumulative +20, Christie and Gei s

see Appendix B) to five hundred and sixty two (562 )

ma le subjects. · All tests were scored and compared to discern i f
any significant homogeneity differences were obvious relative to Mach
t ype concentrations among the different subject population pools
t ested.

Analysis ·yielded no significant differences in the

di stribution of high, or low Machs across the four major po pulations
tested (i.e. TU and USF college students at random, Naval Tra ining
Center recruits, Kappa Alpha Fraternity members, and sworn personnel
of t he Orange County Sheriff's Department.)
i ndividuals

sco~i n~_between

Low Machs, t hos e

40 and 80, numbered· 11%, thus accounting

for 28.67% of the total population.

Mach V tests (forced choice,
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20 question most/least, weighted score +20 (Christie and Geis,

197~

--

p. 2?-32, see Appendix B) were then administered to a randomly
selected total of sixty-three )63) of those subjects living in
Orange County who had completed the Mach IV test.

Low Machs were

considered to be those individuals whose scores fell below 80,
while a high Mach was indicated by any score equal to or greater
than 110.

Each subject•s score on Mach V was compared to his

score on Mach IV;

if a subject•s score did not correlate suffi ciently

between tests such that when both scores were averaged the total no
l onger fell within the range for his Mach classification that
subject was withdrawn from the population pool.

Forty-six (46)

of the sixty-three (63) subjects tested were selected for the
additional testing on the basis of their high or low score on the
Mach IV test.

Of these forty-six subjec'ts, four (4) were discarded

du e to lack of score correlation, yielding two Mach pools of twentyone (21) each high and low Machs.

The remaining seventeen (17)

su bjects were chosen at random from a population pool consisting of
mid range Mach IV scorers who were available for further testing and
1nt erested in participating in one or more of the experimental
conditions.

One of these individuals was not considered for study

ue to lack of correlation between Mach test scores.
From the fifty-eight (58) males in the final population pool ,
thi rty-six (36) subjects were actually used.

Six (6) triads consist-

ing of one each high, middle and low Mach were drawn randomly from
the pool and then two (2) triads were placed into one of eac h of the
three experimental conditions.

This proved to be an extremely
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time-consuming unconservative means of instituting the experimental
manipulations.

Therefore a more economical and efficient method of

triad construction was devised.

Utilizing rotation, this method

placed each subject in all three experimental conditions while
assuring that no subject was ever placed in a triad which contained
another subject with whom he had interacted in any previous
experimental condition.

This method of rotation not only

conserved subjects, lessened the load of coordinating times and
personal schedules, but also reduced confusion as to how the game
was played, thus eliminating the need for rule reading, warm-up
r ounds; etc. after the initial experimental condition.

(For a

diagram of the rotation system used see Appendix A.).

This alloe-

ed the formation of eighteen (18) triads, made up of eighteen (18)
subjects in two nine (9) subject units, / supplying six (6) triads
per experimental condition.

These eighteen (18) triads when com-

bi ned with the six (6) early triads, yielded eight (8) triads in
each experimental condition.

(Twenty-two (22) of the subjects

f ully tested were not selected to participate in any experimental
condition.)
Procedure
As in the pilot study all subjects were given a printed
in structional handout (see Appendix A) and allotted individual study
ti me prior to engaging in a verbal recap of the game and bargai ning
procedures.

The importance of coalition formations was explai ned

and the open ended nature of coalition for majority and plea bar -
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gaining was discussed.

Each participant was briefed on the score

tabulation process and an effort was made to familiarize all
participants with the request for reread and bold challenge
procedures.
The scoreboard was either a chalk board or newsprint pad, upon
which was lined a vertical simple linear scale, from -5 to +20
inclusive.

(This aspect differs slightly from the procedure in

the pilot study in that the scale is one space shorter, hence
winning occurs at 20 as opposed to 21.)

The scale is divided

into equal thirds vertically with each subject•s name written in
at the zero space, in alphabetical order from left to right.

The

subjects sat within arm 1 s length of the designated control block
(either a standard chalk board eraser, or a 2 x 2 x 6" piece of
11

11

white pine) centered among them.
After all subjects in a triad said they understood what was
to be expected during play, the experimenter ran a trial reading
(this step was deleted if all subjects within a triad had played
the game before) after which any final questions a subject had were
answered.

In Condition 1. the ·experimenter closed the pregame

discussion by emphasizing to all participants that each reading
constituted a new condition subject to no restrictions from any
previous coalitions, and that each particpant was to accrue as
many points as possible per reading, maximizing scoring t o hi s
fullest potential.
Condition 2.

The experimenter restated all the informatio n given
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in the first condition, additionally stressing the need for each
player to focus his attentions on winning and applying himself to
efficiently complete the bargaining task.

The experimenter

emphasized that all players should accumulate as many points as
possible without regard for the outcomes of any other player.
this point the experimenter then said,

11

At

0bviously the tests which

each of you took recently have some bearing upon this experimental
game.

Perhaps I should shed some more light on the issue to

clear up a little of the confusion.

First, the study of commun i -

cation overlaps into most other areas of the social sciences, li ke
psychology.

One area of parallel interdisciplinary research

concerns itself with how different personality variables relate to
communication and behavior of persuasive or manipulative intent.
Each of you in this group, based so l ely on these tests, has been
c1as sed as either a high, middle or 1ow Mach.

11

~1ach-ness

11

as

derived from the writings of Niccolo Machiavelli, an Italian
statesman, is the extent to which one advocates manipulating
situations and people to one•s own ends.

Now without going into

a long or moralistic diatribe on how the Machiavellian personality
manifests itself, suffice to say that one of you in this group is
a high Mach and should exhibit some very Machiavellian tendenc ie s
while the one who is a low Mach probably will not.

Now that's all

I 'm allowed to say at this point in time, if you are interested in
additional information, call me at work in May or June.
begin

11
•

Now let's
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The experimenter's pregame discussion in Condition 3. included
I

all of the material contained in Condition 2, but excluded any
additional emphasis placed on task orientation.

In addition to

the dialogue disclosure concerning the Machiavellian personality,
the experimenter included

11
••

suffice to say that in bargaining

situations wuch as this higher Machs do significantly better jobs
of achievi·ng their goals at the expense of lower Machs.

In this

group, (subject's name) is the highest Mach, and (subject ' s n.ame)
is the lowest Mach.

If you are interested in . additional i nforma-

tion, call me at work in May or June.
the best .Mach win.

Now let us beg i n, and may

11

From the main choice bank of 60 technique cards of t en types,
twenty cards, two of each type were drawn at random for Co nditi on . 1,
of those cards remaining every other one /went into a stack des i gnated for Condition 2, the remainder being reserved for Condition . 3.
There was also a secondary choice of 20 additional technique ca rds
f rom which readings were drawn whenever any game played exceeded
twenty readings.

. In each condition the experimenter read tec hnique

cards selected at random from the card bank for that co ndi t io n.

If

any subject requested a re-reading, the request was granted. ·
Readings continued and particpants bargained, challenged, and
entered

into~coalition

accumulating points until one i ndi vidual or

coalition advanced across the +20 line to win, at whic h poi nt the
experimenter officially declared the game over and all subjects
were then released or rescheduled for additional bargai ning situations.
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Of the thirty-six (36) subjects who arranged to participate in the
experiment only one was unable to attend a scheduled session
fortunately one of the middle Machs from one of the "single play"
triads was available to fill in.

Hence six High Mach subjects

played one game each and six played three games each;

five middle

Mach subjects played one game each, five played three games each,
and two played two games each;
and six played three games each.

six low Machs played one game each
The average number of readings

necessary to establish a winning participant in Condition .1, was
eighteen (18);

in Condition .2, sixteen (16) readings, and in

Condition .3, twenty-two (22) readings were necessary.

(Much of

the increase in average number of readings in Condition .3 can be
attributed to the one triad in which thirty-eight (38) readings
were required to complete the game.).

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Results
Individual total point scores in each Mach grouping for all
three experimental conditions are listed in Table 4.
Tab 1e 4

RAW TOTAL POINTS SCORED BY EACH SUBJECT

Condition .1:

High Mach

Middle Mach

Low Mach

18

20

12

16

/ 20

16

20

8

6

20

12

20

20

18

9

20

20

4

18

15

20

20

14

11

152

127

98
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Condition .2:

Condition .3:

High Mach

Middle Mach

Low Mach

20

12

20

20

20

10

20

18

8

20

15

11

15

14

20

20

20

14

20

16

14

20

20

20

155

135

117

15

20

20

20

l4

11

20

20

20

18

18

20

12

20

14

19

20

18

20

9

20

11

20

16

135

141

139

The raw score data from Table 4 were submitted to a One -Way
Analysis of Variance, the results of which are di sp l ayed i n
Table 5.
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Tab 1e 5

ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF BARGAINING SUCCESS
AS A FUNCTION OF MACHIAVELLIANISM.

Experimental
Condition
1.

2.

Source of
Variation
Between
Samples

df

182.58

2

Within
Samples

406.37

21

Total
Variation

588.96

23

90.34

2

Between
Samples
thin
Samples

254.62

21

Total
Variation

344.96

23

2.34

2

~~i

3.

ss

Between
Samples

MS

F

p

4.72

<.02

3.73

<. 04

91.30

19.35

45.17

-' 12.12

1.17
.083

Within
Samples

294.62

21

Total
Variation

296.96

23

>.92

14.03

The overall treatment effect was significant in support of the
main hypothesis (F 2,69

= 7.57 p <.001).

The data in Tabl e 5

reveals that the influence of Machiavellianism was a si gn i ficant
factor in Condition .1. (F 2, 21

=

4.72 p <.02) and , to a somewhat
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lesser

ex~ent

also significant in Condition .2 (F 2,21

=

3.73

--

significant beyond the .05>p confidence level).

The results from

Condition .1, fall into line with those gleaned from the pilot
study, hence supporting research

prediction #1.

The results

from Condition .2 appear to conflict somewhat with the anticipated
direction of research prediction #2.

However, as shall be

demonstrated in Table 6, rejection of the hypothesis in this case
need not signify acceptance of the null hypothesis.
Examination of Table 5 data for Condition

~3

yields (F 2,21

=

.083 NSD) a strong indication that the influence of Machiavellianism
has indeed been constrained.

Thus, lending support to research

predictiqn #3 by accepting the hypothesis as stated.
It must be realized that some variations do not adequately
reflect the full extent of the restraints /of the finite bargaini ng
universe within each experimental condition where the point score
of 20 is an absolute.

Placing this into its proper perspective

both the dependent nature of score acquisition and the significance
of even a two point spread between the top scorers are factors which
are not well represented in raw point score analysis.

Though game

score is calculated on a linear ordinal scale, the increments are
weighted by the particpants in the bargaining situation with
increasing significance in ascending order.

With this in mind ,

the importance of scores which differ, let us say four points between
highest and lowest players bears more relative impact between 15 and
1~

(where the player with the lower score must take increased risks ,

prevent any successful plea bargaining, and cope with the add it ional
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Table 6

CHI-SQUARE COMPARISON OF BARGAINING SUCCESS
AS A FUNCTION OF MACHIAVELLIANISM

Experimental
Condition
1.

Mach
Group

Frequency
Observed

Frequencya
Expected

High

152/377

125.67/377

40.3%

Middle

127/377

125.67/377

33.7%

98/377

125.67/377

25.9%

Low

x2 = 11.62 df2
2.

p<.Ol

High

155/407

135.67/407

38%

Middle

135/407

135.67/407

33.2%

Low

135/407

135.67/407

28.7%

x2 = 5.33
3.

Percent of
Total

df2

p<. 07

High

135/415

138.34/415

32.5%

Middle

141/415

138.34/415

33.9%

Low

139/415

138.34/415

33.5%

aEach Mach group should receive one third of the total points
therefore, the expected frequency equals 33.33% of the total
points scored for each experimental condition.
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stress factor of his opponent's

11

game point 11 status, etc.) than

the same point devi·a-tfon when players are in mid game between 9 and
13.

This significance is not realized by raw point score F tests,

hence the possibility of dubious reliability of ANOVA indication
of significance.

Therefore non-parametric measures of the data

in Table 4 were also taken.
As shown in Table 6, using the cumulative total technique
developed in the pilot study, a score is derived which may be
calculated, via the Chi-Square statistical procedure, against 33.33%
of the total expected value (i.e. each group should receive an
equal third of the total points).

As one might expect in

Condition .1, Chi-Square indicated strong support of research
prediction #1 (X 2 = 11.62 df2 p < .01) attesting to a definite influence
on bargaining success as a function of Machiavellianism Quotient.
In Condition .2 however, contrary to what was supported by ANOVA,
the Chi-Square only 11 Suggested 11 a trend (x 2 = 5.33 df2 p < .07) toward
However, convention ordains the

the influence of Machiavellianism .

. 05 level of confidence sacrosanct thus we may accept the hypothesis
posited in research prediction #2.
in Condition 12, as determined by

Significance levels of the da ta

x2

and ANOVA, reveals a slight

lack of statistical congruence suggesting that partial disclosure
coupled with increased emphasis on the bargaining task may not have
as profound an influence on the effects of Machiavellianism as it
was thought to have.

Condition .3, as anticipated yielded no
signficant difference via Chi-Square (X 2 = .14 df2 p> .93)
supporting the disruption of Machiavellianism's influence in
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conditions of total disclosure, supporting research prediction #3.
To further validate the impact of each condition on limiting
the effects of Machiavellianism on bargaining success, a Pearson •r•
(correlation coefficient) was calculated to establish significant
correlations between Mach score and point score.

In Condition .1,

r =59 significant beyond the .01 confidence level;
r

= .39

significant beyond the .05 conficence level;

Condition 13, r

=

in Conditi on .2,
and in

.20 an insignificant slightly negative correlation.

Again one should note that the results support significance in the
direction of the research predictions.

Having established conf irma -

tion of the Main Hypothesis and the first three research predictions ;
analysis of changes or modifications of Machiavellian implementati on
of power strateg1es among conditions which account for the disrupti on
of Machiavellian influence is now in order:
Power Stategy Analysis
The rationale for implementing various power plays has been
covered in the Power Strategy section of the Pilot Study, for a
review of same please check Chapter I.

Table 7 contains t he raw

data scores of all subjects separated into Mach groups and di vid ed
into the respective experimental conditions.
The overall pattern of bargaining activity for al l three Mac h
groups in each experimental condition was vigorous and i n l i ne with
that observed in the Pilot Study.

Directional consistency of

·

results between Condition .1 and the Pilot Study was expect ed, but
the fact that these consistencies carried almost completely into
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Table 7

RAW SCORE COMPARISON OF BARGAINING STRATEGIES
BY MACH GROUP

Controller

Plea Bargain
Made Accepted

Coalition

%

Condition . 1:
High Mach

46

24

22

44

42%

Middle Mach

54

21

10

32

30%

Low Mach

32

8

5

28

26%

Bo1d Ch a11 en ge

Correct

Incorrect

%

High Mach

14

12

2

85.7%

Middle

16

7

9

43.7%

8

2

6

25%

~·1ach

Low Mach

Controller

Plea Bargain
Made Accepted

Coalition

%

Condition . 2 :
High Mach

60

28

26

51

41%

Middle Mach

64

23

14

38

31%

Low Mach

44

10

7

33

27%
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Bo 1d Ch a11 en ge

Correct

Incorrect

%

High Mach

10

10

0

100%

Middle Mach

18

10

8

55.5%

Low Mach

12

4

8

33.33%

Controller

Plea Bargain
Made Accepted

Coalition

%

Condition . 3:
High Mach

84

21

13

29

25%

Middle Mac·h

68

16

12

46

41%

Low Mach

38

12

9

37

33%

Bo 1d Ch a 11 en ge

Correct

Incor"rect

%

High Mach

24

10

14

41%

Middle Mach

16

8

8

50%

Low Mach

14

6

8

42%
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Condition .2

w~s

quite unanticipated.

Generally speaking, high

Machs in the first two conditions, while no more active than middle
or low Machs, consistently succeeded in maintaining a slight but
statistically non-significant advantage over their triad mates in
the Controller and Plea Bargain modes.

As suggested in the Pilot

Study this constant "edge" may have some cumulative effect on
bargaining success but such speculation has, at this time, no
statistical support..

On the other hand, both the Bold Challenge

mode and Coalition for Majority formation proved to be significant
factors in determining bargaining outcomes.

As shown in Table 8

a Chi-Square reveals high Mach superiority in both Conditions .1
and .2 to be significantly enhanced by effective manipulation of
the Bold Challenge power strategy.
As displayed in Table 8, Condition .3's disclosure factor
'

inhibits effective application of the Bold Challenge power strategy .
It is also quite apparent that full disclosure, rather than task
orientation, limits the ability of high Machs to control the
bargaining structure by dominating Coalition for Majority formation.
Whether high Machs initiated the majority of the coalitions that
they participated in or whether they were selected (prior to
Condition . 3) on the basis of "preferred partner" status is a moot
point.

The fact remains that high Machs tend to be in the majori ty

of winning coalitions so long as their high Mach-ness is not
specifically revealed.

If the high Mach's personality type is

disclosed he enters -significantly fewer coalitions.
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Table 8

POWER STRATEGY SIGNIFICANT FACTOR CHI-SQUARE CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS
BOLD CHALLENGE MODE:

Condition .1:

Condition .2:

Condition .3:

x2 = 9.07

x2 = 10.37

x2 =

df2

df2

df2

p <.02

p < • 01

p >.86

.2892

COALITION for MAJORITY:
Conditions .1-X-.2

Conditions .1-X-.3

Conditions .2-X-.3

x2

x2 =

x2 = 6.625

==

.0063

6.553

df2

df2

df2

p

p <.05

p <,.05

>. 99

60

Significant change in the : utilization of important
bargaining strategies by h.igh Machs between · conditions ·· .l and
.3, with a corresponding drop in outcomes, reconfirms the
major hypothesis and supports research prediction #4.

Hence,

it seems reasonable to interpret this as evidence that situational
threat via personality type disclosure, minimizes · individual
differences in bargaining abilities and manipulative skills
due to Machiavellianism Quotient.
Analysis of Other Factors Influencing Outcomes
I t i s. i ns uf f i c i en t mere 1y to " di s cover " that Mach i ave 11 i an i s m
ceases to have a significant effect on bargaining success in
conditions where full disclosure prevail; without attempting to
understand why this is so.

What exactly js it about

Machiavellian bargaining tactics which was forced to change or
become inoperative between Condition .1 and Condition .3?
Several factors not classified as power strategies per se
appear to have a definite influence on the communication patterns,
hence upon the bargaining outcomes, which typify Machiavellian
behavior.

These factors include:

adapting well to

artificially accelerated game play by exhibiting the ability
to make speedy decisions; apparent cooperation coupled with
tenacious intent to achieve the optimum outcomes; the ability
to define "fairness" to the satisfaction of other members in the
triad which in turn determines the structure of bargaining; and
single minded attention to the immediate bargaining outcome in
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terms of s uper1 or
b~rgaining

stance.

~~sj t

ion, 1n essence lltoughness" of

These four · factors seem· almost to

contradict one another, yet they account for much of the high
Mach's success in the base condition (Condition .1) and lack
of same in the fully disclosed condition (Condition .3).
Speed Factor
A priori assumptions 1n the past confined most of t he game
theory analysis solely to the mathematics of absolute conflict
of interest, forced rationality of outcomes amongst
participants, mutual knowledge of outcomes, and agreement
as to the rank order of strategic preferences; this type of
abstracted formalism has often elicited severe criticism as to
general applicability.

One such criticism levied against the

present study attacks a possible elemental flaw in
operationalization; that the sine qua non, forced quick
decisions, are not truly representative of communication and
behavior which produce the same outcomes as would occur natural ly.
Can the compression-of-time factor actually be equated with
situations where decisions are made in a slow and deliberate
manner?
In line with Durkin's (1967) analysis of the cogniti ve
dichotomy existing between high and low Machs, is the obser vation
in this thesis that high Machs more so than lows enjoy a hi gh
tension "snap decision" bargaining environment.

The reason

for this may be quite simple; the pressure of forcing speedy
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decisions increases stress upon the

b~rgainers

which in turn

enhances irrelevant affect - a main criterion for optimum
expression of Machiavellianism.
Machs were able to keep the

In Condition .1 the high

b~rgaining

perhaps because all participants

pace accelerated ·

th~ught

this was part of the

game's purpose, that speedy decision in some way pleased t he
experimenter or was encouraged by him, or simply because the
sooner the game was over the sooner someone would be
declared a winner and everyone could
business.

the~

go about his da i ly

However, in Condition .3, high Mach attempts

to pick up the bargaining pace were met with both passive and
active resistance.

Passive resistance took the form of

asking the experimenter for technique card rereadings tota lli ng
24% more than asked for in Condition .1.

Active resistance

manifested itself in substantially more intra group communication
directed toward individuals who pressured for accelerated
decision making, in the form of retorts demanding time to think.
Several subjects commented on the fact that they fe l t t he
game made them rush into a decision which normally they woul d
have pondered longer or not made at all if they weren't more
positive of the results.

The applicability of this researc h

then may be more directly significant for crisis type barga ining
decision making than for lengthy negotiation.

Taking th i s

notion one step further; mightn't the Machiavellian persona lity
variable as established in Condition .1 and Condit i on .2 ,

63

be a factor which _h_~_l_gs secure early advant.ages in

b~rgaining

- an immediate phenomenon - the impact of which may very well
be reduced as the relationships

the participants develop,

am~ng

mature, and stabilize as a function of extended interaction a longitudinal phenomenon - effecti.ng disclosure similar to
that which affected results in Condition .3?
Cooperation
Bargaining is likely to be more active when at least one
of the participants profoundly exhibits those tendencies
indicated .by high Machiavellianism Quotient pretests, and at
least one of the other individuals in the triad exhibits an
attitude of passive cooperation.

Any exploitative and

manipulative behavior is then revealed in bold relief when
contrasted with the docile and dependent actions of very
cooperative lower Machs.

Successful bargaining fluctuates

between these two extremes with the largest continual gains
made by those individuals who "appear to espouse egalitarian
11

attitudes while taking advantage of the other participants.
In most situations the best policy, in terms of maximizing
gains, seems to be one tending toward cooperation but actively
goal directed, such than flexibility does not interfere with
success orientation.
Expressed throughout this thesis are many statements
of theoretical possibility which maintain that personality
is important to the communication process which determines the
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outcomes duri.ng a

b~rga i ni.ng

situation, contending that each

participant brings to the situation -propensities to communicate
in certain general ways, and within the situation their
personality variables interact with environmental characteristics
to determine specific behaviors and outcomes.

This idea

conceived in the framework of the above stated bargaining
conditions suggests that the differences observed between Condition
.1 and Condition .3 can be explained as personality variable

-X- experimental situation interaction.
Fairness
As odd as it may sound, effective manipulation often
depends upon one's wielding the pressure of "fairness;"
for without this concept bargainers find it difficult to
quickly make and accept the concessions necessary to reach an
agreement.

Fairness and "honesty should not in this case be
11

misconstrued to mean the same thing.

An adept player can

misrepresent his interests either by hyperbole or understatement
and secure an agreement which is factually to his distinct
advantage, although it would appear quite fair to his opponents.
High Machs tended to control the "definition of fairness"
discussions in Condition .1 and .2 by virtue of their self cast
leadership role.

In Condition .3 however, any discussion

initiated or directed by the high Mach was apt to elicit
responses from the other triad members insinuating or boldly
maintaining that some greater ulterior motive was behind s uch

65

discussions.

Not unexpectedly middle Machs in this condition

often 11 Mached-out" higher Machs :· by forcing them into a
secondary control position or distracting them from the
immediate task at hand via irrelevant innuendo concerning
evil and manipulative Machiavellian people.
Toughness
Since bargaini_ng ;·s basically a process whereby positions
that are divergent become

11

identical" allowing par es who

disagree initially to reach a mutual agreement; bargaining fer
coalition can therefore be viewed as either a series of
decreasing demands or an all-or-nothing situation.

The

outcome of every reading in which bargaining took place
was analyzed by comparing the number of t!mes a subject made
a demand and was allotted a concession with the frequency
that he rejected a lesser counter-proposal, thus deriving a
general measure of "toughness. 11

A "tough 11 bargainer was

one who started with high demands and made concessions
infrequently; whereas

11

Softness" in bargaining was indicated

by low initial demands and a subject's willingness to accept
any counter-proposal.

In each reading then, the final outcome

of bargaining as reflected in point score accrued by each
subject yielded a rough index of bargaining success as a
function of toughness or softness.
Irrespective of Mach grouping, as a subject participated

1n
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successive experiments, his
"softer. 11
p~r

b~rga in i ng

neither.· grew ·. '.' to.ugher" nor

Thus passage of time ·in the bargaining situations

se does not appear to alter · an individual's style bf

bargaining for coalition.

Unfortunately this research

design had no definitive means for measuring the actual degrees
to which the toughness/softness variable influenced specific
bargaining outcomes.

Generally

speaki~g,

high and middle

Machs were tougher and successfully controlled their situations ,
tending to continue being tough throughout the experiments .
Conversely, low Mach subjects tended to drive soft bargains
as a result of the toughness displayed by one or both of his
opponents, rather than a function of any conciliatory attitude
displayed by an opponent.

There was virtually no difference
..

0

between the proportion of higher Machs who responded to
concession by making a concession and those who responded by
not making one.
Examination of exhibitions of toughness/softness across all
conditions suggests that it is not so much that toughness was
a good strategy, but rather, that softness was a poor one.
Except in the Plea Bargain mode, an extremely soft bargaining
strategy tended to place the individual on the outside of any
coalition formed.

Low Mach players were three times as

likely as high Machs to exhibit "extremely" soft bargaining
strategies.

Softness in

th~

Bold Challenge mode actually

hindered progress toward any coalition or non-punitive form
of resolution.

Comparison of the Plea Bargain and the Bo l d
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Chall~nge

mode

rey~gls

that

t~ughness

times with contradictory consequences.
decreases the likelihood of a Plea

plays a dual role, oft
While toughness

B~rga ·1n

Coalition; it

increases the payoff for those who survive the possibility
of failure in the Bold Challenge mode.
In the Coalition for Majority mode, where bargaining
is relatively flexible,

t~ughness

in the majority of the cases.
"tough"

b~rgainers,

proved to be a bad strategy

High Machs were the most able

however, middle Machs employed the

technique as frequently but gained an average of 23% fewer
points across all conditions.

It should be noted that the

total information, fully disclosed condition, yielded the
fewest successful attempts as

11

toughness," suggesting that the

more accurate a bargainerts information is about their
opponents, the more likely toughness is to prevent coalition.

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Restatement of Major Findings
High Machs were more successful as predicted than low Machs in
mixed-motive bargaining coalition situations.

Much of this success

is attributed to their superior manipulative abilities, lack of
emphasis on conventional ethical standards, and a detached approach
to interpersonal functioning.

Until such time as Machiavellian

Quotients were disclosed, participants controlled the balance of
bargaining power, both in leadership and judgment, to their advantage
in proportion to their respective Machiavellianism Quotients.
Disclo.sure of the Nature of Machiavellianism, emphasis on task
orientation, and particularly the impact of revealing each individual
Machiavellianism Quotient to all members of the bargaining triad were
shown to negate any innate or acquired superior manipulative skill
possessed by a member Machiavellian.

In short, the effects of

Machiavellianism on bargaining success were limited 1)

personally

labeling Machiavellian individuals as manipulators, and to a lesser
extent 2)

stressing the need for all participants to concentrate on

the task at hand.
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Condition l;

Pilot Study Revisited

Quoting from page 23 in Chapter I, typi.ca 1 game p1ay "

revea 1s

the 'disadvantaged' lowest. are not, as one might expect, helpless,
but rather are taken unawar.e.

The next higher Mach, often the most

active and certainly one of the most .powerful players, presses for
advantage too impetuously, succombing less to the inherent superiority of his opponents than to his own judgmental errors.

By thi s

same token, the more successful and powerful high Mach players are
aggressive but cautious, appealing to the sensibilities of their
opponents while constantly (almost .. relentlessly) seeking the
advantage.

Without intending to sound melodramatic, high Machs

almost 'mesmerize' others into committing some concentration shift
where inadvertent blundering, the factor between winning and not
winning, decides the outcome in favor of the highest Mach."
Restatement of research prediction #1;

in Condition .1, high

Machs will successfully out bargain lower Machs and receive a
significant and disproportionately large share of the outcomes which
will result in high Machs winning more games.
Brtefly reviewing the chronology of events in Condition .1
bargaining one notes that there is some indication that for the firs t
third of the ·game all players interact more or less as equals.
During this time much 11 table talk 11 • probing, examination of other
player's attitudes, and reality/knowledge testing transpires among
participants.

It becomes increasingly obvious that internal struggles

are taking place;

with one (or more) of the players, usually a higher

Mach, making an effort to impose their value system, enhance personal
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believability, and dominate the attention of the other players between
readings.

The initial all-for-one alliance attitude quickly trans-

forms into a conditional situation where

positivr~

and negative inter-

personal rewards are being used as the fulcrum for coalition formation.
(e.g.
1
'

Hence, either promoting future mutually beneficial interactions
11

Keep up the good work. dude. 11 ) , soothing injured egos (e.g.

damn game is trickier than I thought. . . . but we 11 get it together
1

next time. 11 ) , or ·a si 1ent battle. of w.i ll s between at 1east two players
in whi.ch a substantia 1 effort is made either to . psych-outu the
11

competition or appear to be totally aloof.
The turning point of the game usually takes place about 3/ 5 ths
into the readings (8 to 10 techniques read), at which time one player
,

has begun to

11

fall by the wayside and the conflict is bei ng ca rried
11

on between two approxima-tely equal opponents..

At. this point t he

critical errors are most likely to occur (e.g. too little concen t ra tion
before attaining the control position, emotionally motivate Bold
Cha 11 enges, hasty forming ·of · uns·tab 1e co a1i ti ons, etc. ) as we 11 as the
"tough 11 but subtle power plays (e.g. Controller made Bold Challenges ,
Coalition for Majority with no acceptance .of Plea Bargainers, etc. )
The final 20%. of the game is usually either 1)

a struggle agains t

the most likely coalition by the odd-person out (at this point t he
lowest. score player usually poses no threat and is sought for partnership by the other players), or 2)

cautious bargaining by one player

(or perhaps two) uttempting to slow or halt the advances of another.
Ultimately there is a winner or winning coalition, usually bei ng or
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containing the highest Mach.
There are seven generally prominent bargaining features observable
in almost every triad in Condition .1:
1)

High and middle Machs initiate cooperation the most; low
Machs do so least.

2)

High Machs wield -Bold Challenge power most effectively whereas
middle .and low Machs were less adept at same.

3)

High Machs, as anticipated, exhibit the most successful
efforts to manipulate others.

Cons.istent with their perf orm-

ance 1n the Pilot Study, low Machs had far the fewest succesful attempts at manipulation.
4)

High Machs tend to respond quickly to the changes in their
partner's behavior, and attempt to "punish another's shift
11

from cooperation to antagonism.
5) low Machs di -scrim.i nated between the o·ther Mach groups ·w; thin
the triad preferring high Machs during bargaining, middle
Machs preferred high slightly more than low Machs, while
high Machs exhibited no signs of preference.

(It is

interesting to note that this tendency was expressed in both
the Coalition for Majority and the Plea Bargain modes.)
6)

High Machs tend to control conversations which discuss
proportionment of outcomes.

7)

Low Machs frequently exhibit "softness

11

in their barga in i ng

styles as a function of the "toughness

11

ex hi bi ted by hi gher

Machs.
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Such differences, as stated above, between high and low .Mach
behavior may be accoun-t"ed for through 11 encounter-theory 11 (Durkin
1967) "The Cool Syndrome vs the Soft Touch" philosophy (Christie
and Ge.i s 1970)

11

rationality vs vulnerability .. (Burgoon et. al. 1974) ,

or by this author•s concept of personality and environmental
bargaining situation interaction in which all bargainers are confli ct
assertive or conflict interactive.
In this concept high Machs in Condition .1; exhibit conflict
assertive/resolution directive communication and behavior, while
low Machs opt for the path of least resistance; that being conflict
submi ss i ve/reso 1uti on. interactive.

Needless to say middle Machs

fluctuate somewhere between these extremes.

The· Machiavellian

personality pretest measures only indicate an individual's predisposition to accepting dominant or less dorrrinant roles in mixedmotive bargaining coalition situations.

Whereas during the actual

bargaining interactions a multitude of factors either facilitate or
inhibit implementation of tactics or strategies which directly influence the final outcomes and dependent upon these factors,
Machiavellianism . is either advantageous or not.
Condition .2, A Closer Look
Restating research prediction #2; when all subjects are spec ifically instructed to concentrate on optimizing the bargaining task
to overcome the influence of a skilled Machiavellian manipula tor in
their midst; high Machs will win somewhat more points than low Machs ,
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but the margin of difference will not be as profound as in
research prediction #., -.-Emphasizing task orientation and establishing that the triad
consisted of one each high, middle, and low Mach; with an accompanying dialogue on what -Machiavellianism is and how it effects
bargaining situations, had . only one discerni.ble effect, all Mach
groups did slightly better than they had in Condition .1.

This

would lead one to conclude that while it is true that such information does indeed . help non-Machiavellians compete in the bargaini ng
situation, it also provides such incentive for Machiavellians.
Hence, it is· incorrect to assume, as Burgoon et. a1 (197 4, p. 44)
suggests that such information will minimize the influence of a
high Mach.

In actuality this strategy simply heightens the focus

of all participants without regard for Machtavellianism Quotient.
Low Machs continue to lose in spite of partial disclosure, appear
to be unconcerned or unable to discern that their most frequently
11

Chosen 11 partner was indeed the high Mach, and .by several low

Mach subject's own admission proceeded with the bargaining irrespective of any titles or personality types included in pregame
discussion.

High Machs, on the other hand, kept their attentions

on the goal uninvolved with their interest in the implicit information regarding Mach grouping.
High Machs tended to use the information that each triad was
constructed according to Mach quotient as a strategic barricade
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from which to launch a smoke screen of "distrust" and "accusation".
This provided sufficient irrelevant affect ·to more than compensate
for any increase in outcome realized ·by low Machs perhaps contaminating any resultant increase brought about through heightened
concentration on the bargaining task.
Condition .2, produced three times as many verbal contracts
between players as di.d Condition .1.

Six of these agreements to

establish continuing but information coalitions were formed; includi-ng..a high Mach and a low Mach. in three instances, a high and
a middle Mach in two, and a high, middle, and low i n one instance.
Humorously enough, it was often the actual high Mach of the group who
pointed out to one of the other members of the triad that the t hird
player's actions could only be construed to be the manipulations of
a Machiavellian type" and in this manner turned the focus of
11

attentions from himself by establishing a "common enemy".
The contrast effect of this common enemy tended to diminish
mutual differences between allies, providing an outgroup part icipant for negative reference.

Thus, in effect, minimizing perceived

differences within a dyadic group by increasing conflict between
that group and the remaining person in ·the triad.

The very

suggestion of this type accusation stimulated the competitive conflict situation, increasing distrust and in two instances severely
reduced group communication either to or from the excluded par ty.
Seemingly, the more the ousted bargainer attempts to persuade the
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others to his side, the more the others reject his information as
--

being merely attempts at manipulation; this fact was even more
clearly displayed ir. Condition 3.
Obviously it is possible for- any participant to attempt a
direct influence. attempt surreptitiously; with the identifying
characteristics of such an attempt that the perpetrator of the intended manipulation behaves and initiates corrnnunication as if the
target individual(s) can not or do not perceive the perpetrator's
own interests in accomplishing said manipulation . Naturally some
perpetrators are rather i-nept, clumsy, and obvious in their manipulative attempts apparently only marginally aware that :heir
target is not deceived by the tactics being used.

One manifesta-

tion of conflict assertive/resolution directive high Mach strategy
is that they rarely appear to succumb to obvious or blatant manipulations, when such tactics if discovered would be disadvantageous.
Generally, the high . Mach successfully perpetrates manipulative
attempts upon his target in a manner which, quite frequently in
Condition .2, results in the target expressing great satisfaction
at the 11 Victory" which, to a major extent, was had at his conflict
submissive/resolution interactive expense!
Drawn from the comments made during and after bargaining
sessions by low Machs in Condition .2, there is a possibility that
a significant factor between low and high Mach performance is
that low Machs assume that their partners are "Just like themu,
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thereby attributing low Mach motives to Machiavellian behavior.
Though equally motivated to participate, low Machs neglect to
manipulate the situation to their own best advantage, erroneously
assuming that the egalitarianism and fair play espoused by their
opponents will triumph.
losing strategy.

This is not only an ineffective but a

Unfortunately no formal posttest was adminis-

tered to confirm this contention, hence it must be considered
speculation.
Condition .3, Affecting the Effect
Restate~ent

of research prediction #3; full disclosure of the

nature of Machiavellianism, coupled with revelation of the
Machiavellianism Quotient of each participant, should effectively
equalize and limit any effects on bargaining /due to Machiavellianism.

Hence, no statistically significant score disparity among

participants will occur.
Comparison of the three experimental conditions reveals; that
the Machiavellian uses many strategies to resolve conflicts of
interest, his adeptness at same leads to concessions by naive
opponents resulting in successfully shifting the bargaining outcome in his favor (Condition .1), where competent implementation
of strategies results in superior manipulation cf available power.
Power deficiencies may even be overcome by intelligent employment
of various subversive or misrepresentative strategies (Condition
.2).

However, especially over repeated interactions, strategies
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and bargaining styles associated with deception, unfairness,
and manipulative intent are learned by the opposition, resulting
in the development of reactive counter-strategies, (Condition .3)
which in turn produces a level of 11 bargaining awareness 11 involving
correspondingly negative or aversive conditions which will not
necessarily be surmounted via implementation of a strategy - in
fact, the reverse is true, once the deceptive nature of Machiavellian
strategy is disclosed, the merest exhibition of competitive bargaining by the person so accused results in the escalation of conflict
and a resultant decline in his outcomes.
The

bas~

of a Machiavellian's influence on bargaining is success-

fully implementing power to affect another's responses; hence, the
crux of much of the intricate and subtle behavior which constitutes
11

bargaining

dition.

11

in a mixed-motive situation in the fully revealed con-

A high Mach's use of power to affect the other bargainer's

outcomes adversely often adversely affected his own outcome, hence
he was less likely to resort to manipulative behavior.
In one instance a twice successful top scorer high Mach reacted
so negatively to the disclosure in Condition .3 that he refused to
make or acknowledge any bargaining offers.

He limited his partici-

pation to Bold Challenges and consistently chose the previous
reading's correct response as his answer.

This strategy resulted i n

the lengthiest time of play (38 readings), and had virtually the
same effect as refusing to respond at all; thereby reducing the
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immediate outcomes for all players.
What in essence occurs is a bargainer's natural predisposition to accept his usual conflict assertive/resolution
directive role is thwarted; which simply means that someone else
must, to a greater or lesser extent, fulfill that function.
thwarted or deposed individual has several alternatives:
accept a more secondary role (e.g.

The

a) He may

conflict assertive/resolution

submissive) and hope for the best outcome possible;

b) He can 90

it 11 alone and attempt to maintain his comfortable role;

11

c) He can

refuse to participate, inhibit communication, and generally attempt
to disrupt the bargaining; and d) He can discredit the source whic h
forced his deposition, change bargaining situations, or if he allows
sufficient time to pass, win by default.

The ideas espoused here/

in, though 11 0riginal 11 , are not new.

Surprisingly enough, every one

of these suggestions and several more can be gleaned from the works
of a Florentine secretary, one Niccolo Machiavelli; strange how
little the nature of man, bargains, conflict and communication change
in over six centuries.
Conclusions
The major disadvantage of using Mach tests, or any paper and
pencil measure designed to test for a specific personality var i ab le,
is that their value is limited by not revealing more of the t ot al
personality.

Therefore, problem areas regarding validity and
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reliability manifest themselves immediately upon generalization
-

.

-

from the simplest controlled conditions to conditions which are
either more complex or less controlled.

Comparison of the three

conditions indicates that the communication process during bargaining is affected by factors of both personality and situation
suggesting an interaction effect.

If indeed this is so, future

researchers might do well to manipulate other situational variables
to discover those situations in which personality differences
account for greater· and lesser impacts on connnunication.

At

present, the chasm between the controlled laboratory environment
and

11

real-11fe" situations is observed as a formidable obstacle

in the task of creating a scientific approach to conflict resolution via communication research.

This gap may be crossed if the
/

same "laws

11

govern events in both conditions - as no such universal

laws are readily discernible in human interactions, the bridge
must therefore develop from the study of mini-conflicts with clearly
defined and controlled issues, progressing to larger conflicts with
more poorly defined goals observed by convoluted issues.

Additional

conflict research investigating interpersonal communication variables must be undertaken using this laboratory gestation period to
give birth to a viable theory of bargaining applicable not only to
rational conflict, but, more importantly, to the resolution of that
conflict.
While broad generalization is impossible, the importance of a
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study such as this should not be downplayed because it investigates atypical personality effects.

It would appear likely that

in "real-life 11 situations it is the atypical personality which often
plays the major role.

Consequently, future communication research-

ers would do well to further investigate atypical personalities,
especially if those personalities tend to typify individuals
responsible for developing situations which are of specific interest
to the researcher.
In conclusion, there are undoubtedly a multitude of areas of
improvement for future researchers investigating personality effects
on communication during bargaining.
readily apparent:

Six such areas of concern are

improved personality measurement; more complex

experimental situations; increased attention to the interaction of
/

personality variables and environmental situations; more attention
to motivations and incentives behind manipulative or non-manipulative behaviors; utilization of more specific indices to log, by
type and impact, communication which enhances bargaining efficacy;
and conceiving of personality variables as roughly equivalent to
valences in chemistry such that a bargaining situation and its
limits may be considered in elemental terms as equations capable
of determining outcomes prior to conflict.
The interaction of all input factors effects the predisposition
to communication within small groups.

Irrespective of content,

the communication patterns which evolve within the group establish
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three basic classifications of variables:

task orientation, inter-

personal characteristics, and procedural development; all interact
affecting the resultant communication.

Adequate assessment of

the determinants which control the ratio between quality and quantity
of effective communication to reach an agreement is impossible unless
those factors which influence the process of persuasion can be
isolated and understood.

To desire knowledge concerning communi-

cation i·nherent in small group bargaining interactions, but to disregard investigation of the elements which may be the key variables
of the persuasive process undermines any value of communication
research.

The implications gleaned by studying personality

variable interactions and limitations related to effective propagandizing, not only provides additional answers about communication, but
/

also fosters inductive insight into the validity of applying these
(and other similar) principles to business management, motivational
seminars; and a variety of seemingly mundane competitive bargaining
situations where persuasion
11

11

is not merely a matter of semantics,

but the intended purpose of the interaction.

APPENDIX A
Rotation Procedure

SUBJECTS:
High Mach;

#1

#2

#3

Middle Mach;

#4 #5 #6

Low Mach;

#7 #8

#9

GROUPS IN TRIAD:
Condition . . 1

Condition .2

Condition . 3

I:

#1, #4, #7

IV:

#1, #5' #9

VI I :

#1' #6' #8

II :

#2, #5' #8

V:

#2' #6' #7

VIII:

#2' #4' #9

III :

#3, #6' #9

VI:

#3, #4, #8 /

IX:

#3, #5' #7
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Rules ·of the Game
1.

Prejudice/Ridicule:

Prejudices exarnp le: A you.ng man wishi.ng to make a good
impression on his girlfriend's father, learns that he is a rabid
Democrat.
So one evening, while waiting for the daughter . to
finish dressing, he engages the "old man" in conversation,
turning it in such a way as to rip the Republicans to pieces.
The father later informs the girl that the young man has "good
stuff in him and should go far.
Meaning: The one who makes
the appeal to persuade you to act or feel in a certain way by
associating his person, product, or proposal with a certain
one of your prejudices, positive or negative--a prejudice being
a prejudgment wrapped in emotion and having a history . Not
only does he rekindle your prejudice, he also arouses i n you
feelings of kinship for one who shares your prejudice (i .e.
himself)--and so exploits you through your weakness.
11

example: The professor , on the first day of
class, having made a certain statement, is asked · an embarass in g
question by a class member.
Preferring a cheap victory to an
honest discussion, the professor replies sarcastically, "I'm
afraid Mr. Jones, that I cannot understand what you mean.
You
are too deep for me.
He then goes on to the next questioner.
Meaning: An attempt is made to influence . us to accept a
certain proposition by poking fun at those who oppose it,
or to discredit their counter proposal by subjecting them to
verbal abuses.
Ridi~ule

11

2.

Abstraction-Ambiguity-Diversion:

Abstration example: A speaker defines ''Neurosis" as a
psychological term for a state of mind involvi.ng the nerves, "
but when he is asked to identify or point to--among a large
number of people--a case of neurosis, he is unable to do so,
showing that he is unable to use the term to make any concre t e
distinctions.
Meaning: An abstracted term is a word or
symbol which stands for the qualities possessed in common
by a number of particular things, facts, or events.
The
technique of abstract terms occurs when an arguer employs
a word for which he may have the meaning in he form of
other words, but the arguer is unable to identify the
concrete facts to which the word supposedly refers.
11

Ambiguity example: Joe says, "Henry likes pudding be tter
than his wife."
Does Henry like pudding better than he likes
his wife or does Henry like pudding more than his wife lik es
pudding? Meaning: A word or phrase is ambiguous if in the
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mind of a hearer or c~ader it·has two or more quite different
meanings and the interpreter is uncertain as to which was
rea 11 y me ant.
Diversion example: Teacher: "Johnny, what were you · doing
outside during study hall? 11
Johnny: "Oh, I dunno . Say
did you know that the School . Nurse and Mr. Higgins the janitor
go down into the basement t.ogether?" Teacher: 11 No!
Really!
I wonder what they would go there for?"
Meaning: To divert
is to get off the subject.
With the original issue left
unresolved, perhaps to join in a discussion or argume nt over
some other unrelated subject.
3.

Rationalization/Pity:

Rationalization example: The student, having failed . the
test, blames his failure on the classroom•s being too hot . .
so hot in fact that he just could not think.
Whereas in
reality he knows that not enough time was spent in study,
Meaning: You cite reasons or causes that
hence his .failure.
will justify action that really has less creditable grounds .
Pity Example: Student to professor: "I know that my
test grades have been poor, and that I deserve an 'F' , but
my dad is in the hospital and it would just kill him for me
to get an 'F' in this course . " Meaning: -· An atte mpt is
being made to secure a commitment by presenting the object
of commitment as an object of sympathy, thereby arousing
our sympathetic feelings to the point where these feelings
determine favorable action.
4.

Wishful Thinking/Oversimplification:

Wishful Thinking example: "My daughter will be chosen
Home-Coming-Queen, because she ought to win after all her
long hard preparation."
Meaning: You believe a proposi t ion
to be true because you want it to be true.
Oversimplification example: "If it were not for the
ammunition makers, we would never have wars.
Meaning: A
complex event is explained by references to only one or two
probable causes whereas many are responsible.
11

5.

Flattery-Status-Manner:

Flattery example: Salesman to young matron answering the
door: "This is my 1ucky day. . . to be greeted at the door
by not only the most youthful and attractive woman on this
street, but obviously, by the look of your house, also t he most
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conscientious."
M~_aning:
An attempt is made to secure our
c om~i tmen t . by p0 i n"t i ng .0 ut i n a very favor ab1e 1i gh t , s orne
man1festat1on of our personal appearance, intellect or some
other category where we wish to excel.
Status example: "Sud so was deve 1oped in the 1aboratory of
It's got to be good!"
a great and famous University.
Meaning: Persons., places, or objects for which we have a
strong sentiment of respect and -esteem- or which at least
possess some degree of fame or prestige - are introduced into
the argument as endorsing that which we are asked to buy or
be 1i eve.
Manner ex amp 1e: "I •m sure he's the president of this
university.
Notice the way he carries himself and the
condescending way in which he speaks to those students. 11
Meaning: A person's manner of behaving is made the basis of
our acceptance or rejection of then without any thought that
this manner may be a deceptive indicator of value.
6.

Acceptable to the Dubious/Draw the Line, Moderatism-Radicalism:

Acceptable to the Dubious example: Advertisement: "The
boys in the ~ervice abroad want letters more than gifts.
Write
Write only good news
frequently because some letters get lost.
because there is enough unpleasantry going ~ on over there.
Buy
and write on Barton's Victory-Bond Stationary and we'll win this
damned war."
Meaning: The arguer states a series of
propositions.
The earlier ones 'are readily acceptable to the
audience or reader, but the later ones are dubious.
The listener
is expected to blindly accept the latter ones because of what
preceded them.
Draw the Line example: 11 Either you tell the truth or you
lie."
Meaning: Sharp distinctions are drawn where it is
inappropriate to draw sharp distinctions.
Moderatism-Radicalism example: "What we need is new ideas,
completely new ways of thinking; the old is not worthy of
our acceptance." . . . vs . . . "Vote for me.
My Radi ca 1Middle party is neither conservative nor radical, we refuse
to take a stand on any specific issue, but we sure can
compromise . . . just think FM as the party which sits on
the fence with both ears to the ground." Meaning: These
quasi-politi-al habits of the mind are similar to prejudice
in form, but prejudice has history whereas ModeratismRadicalism (or the reverse as depicted above) has neither
history nor rational construction.
The dichotomy between
new for newness sake/old for oldness sake vs total avoidance
of any extremes to the point or refusing to make a stand on
any issue; there is no inherent virtue in either.
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7.

Practical Conse9uences/Attacking a Straw-Man:

Practical Consequences example: To paraphrase the movie
''fhe Godfather~~: Make em an offer that they can t refuse.
Meaning: An effort is made to persuade us to comply based
on concern for our individual welfare due to harmful
influences.
1

11

Attacking a Straw-Man example: Forbes: "A good
portion of the best high school students never get to
They just don•t have the money.
Busby: "Forbes,
college.
what you want is to pay kids to go to college . . . how
absurd!"
Meaning: Your opponent either 1) restates your
position falsely or 2) exaggerates its consequences.
11

8.

Bandwagon/Bargain:

Bandwagon example: 11 Join the winners, vote for Senator
Simpkins .
Meaning: An effort is made to influence
you to act in a certain way by asserting or implying that
that is popular or what the majority is doing.
11

Bargain example: Display in a store: "SPECIAL 45¢
each new Ruskin tomatoes.
Upon examination of the shelf,
the regular price is found to be two for 90¢.
Meaning:
An attempt is made to get you to buy by appealing to your
desire to save money . . . hoping that you will not
investigate the situation by price comparison, quality etc.
11

9.
,

Begging or Leading the Question:

Begging the Question example:
Man is a social animal
because he is gregarious.
Meaning: This technique
involves assuming as true what has yet to be proved.
Frequently a similar (or the same) proposition is used
both as arguw~ntal premise and as conclusion.
This may
be done either by 1) the use of synonymous terms or 2) by
circular argument, which involves the use of A to prove B
and B to prove A.
11

11

Leading the Question example:
stopped beat i ng your chi l dr en yet?
question is one which 1) dictates or
2) one which incriminates the answer
11

11

Tell me Jones, have you
Me an i ng: A 1e ad i ng
suggests an answer or
no matter how he answers.

10. No Technique:
No Technique example: "I believe in Federal Aid to
First, let me define education.
Education is the
Education.
act or process of providing someone with knowledge, skill, or

87

competence. 11
Meaning: No man i pul at ion is used to propagandize
you into accept i rr·g-·wh.at is being discussed.
Rules
The 'Reader' selects an example at random from the
bank and reads the card aloud, should the contestants request
a repeat, one re-reading of the example is admissable.
As
soon as any player recognizes (or feel that they know) which
technique is being represented, they identify the technique
on :the pad affixed to the techni que card" (using the
technique identifying number) and immediately grabs the control
If by chance two players
block from the center of the table.
simultaneously grab the block they have an opportunity to
enter into a coalition, if no secure coalition can be
arrived at between them, they may attempt to secure a
"coalition for majority" with the other player, if no
coalition can be reached all players regress (-1) one space.
When only one player has the control block that player is
then known as the Controller and all other players have 10
seconds to also arrive at a conclusion and identify it on
their pads.
All players reveal their answers at the
direction of the 'Reader.'
11

If a unanimous majority occurs the Controller advances 3,
each junior partner advances 1.
If a Controller and one-otherplayer majority exists and no 'Bold Challenge' is made, the
Controller advances 3, the other-player (partner) advances
If a majority
1, and the odd person out remains stationary.
occurs against the Controller and no 'Bold Challenge' is
made, each majority partner advances 2, the ousted Controller
regresses -1.
In the case of any two player majority, the
odd person out may attempt to Plea Bargain - by threatening
the majority with a 'Bold Challenge' - if they will not
allow him to join their coalition . . . if his plea is
accepted all players advance 1; if rejected the threat of
'Bold Challenge' is carried to the 'Reader.' (the penalty
for an incorrect 'Bold Challenge' in the Plea Bargain
If both choices are
condition is -1, the reward is 1.
in error all players regress -1.)
Rewards for a correct
'Bold Challenge' (not preceeded by a Plea Bargain) are 3
spaces advance, while the Controller suffers a penalty of
-2 and hi s part ne r s uf fer s -1 .
If i t i s the Con t ro 11 er
who makes the 'Bold Challenge,' he advances (if correct)
a total of 6, no penalty to the other side.
Penalties
for an incorrect 'Bold Challenge,' for a non-Controller
suffer -2, for a Controller -3.
If a 'Bold Challenge'
is made and neither side is correct (by decision of the
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'Reader') the challe_t'1_ g~e suffers -1, and the incorrect
challenger suffers -the standard penalty according to
condition as stated above.
After the 'Reader' calls for answer revelation and
there is no initial majority, any two players may enter into
a 'coalition for majority' (exactly the same as simultaneous
grabbing of the control block).
In this situation several
alternative courses of action are available, but in any case
no points are made if no majority emerges . . . and if no
majority can be made all players suffer -1.
Any coalition
for majority is open to odd-person out Plea Bargaining should
If a 'coalition
the odd-person-out decide to attempt it.
for majority' is established and no 'Bold Challenge' or
Plea Bargain is made, the partners in the coalition both
advance 2. (Please note any changes in prediction brought
about by a 'coalition for majority' on the score pad of
the player making the prediction shift.)
Examples of Play
A. Player 1, the Controller, identifies the example as #8.
Players 2 and 3 also identify the example as #8.
The
Controller advances 3 the other partners advance 1 each.
B. The same situation as above except player 2 chose
#6; if no 'Bold Challenge' is made the advances are the
same as above except that player 2 remains stationary, if however,
a 'Bold Challenge' is made and it-is incorrect player£
suffers -2 . . . the 'Bold Challenge' was correct player£
advances 3, and the Controller suffers -2 and his partner
suffers -1.
C. Player 1, the Controller, identifies the example as #3.
Players 2 and 3 identify the example as #8.
If no 'Bold
Challenge' is made by the Controller both£ and l advance 2,
the Controller (even though in the odd-player-out position,
having been impetuous grabbing the control block, can not be
challenged as he alone does not constitute a majority)
however suffers -1 for impetuousity.
D. Same situation as above except that the Controller chooses
to make a 'Bold Challenge.'
If the 'Bold Challenge' is
incorrect the Controller suffers -3 and the other players
advance 2.
If the Controller's 'Bold Challenge' is correct
he scores 3 for the 'Bold Challenge' and 3 for the control
block for a total point score of 6. -rf instead of a direct
'Bold Challenge', the Controller chooses to offe~ a Plea
Bargain and is accepted, all players advance 1, 1f on the
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other hand he is reje~ted he suffers -1 for the Plea Bargain
consequence of error and -1 for impetuousity for a total
suffering of -2.
If after the Plea Bargain attempt both
sides were wrong all players suffer -1 (no additional penalty
of impetuousity is levied on the Controller in this case).
If the Controller's 'Bold Challenge• was incorrect for all
sides and players, a penalty of -2 is suffered by all players.
E. All players have a different choice for the example, then
every player has the opportunity to enter into a 'coalition
for majority.•
In these cases if the Controller chooses to
either accept a partner or is accepted as a partner (determined
by whomsoever switches from his initial choice to that of his
partner) then neither the advantages nor the disadvantages
of being the Controller apply to the scoring, hence the
option for 'coalition for majority• is not a function of
Controller asset or deficit.
If however, the Controller
is not in the 'coalition for majority• the same penalties
and liabilities exist as in any other condition.

ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN?
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Sco~ing Key for Mach V (1968)

Points -pe-r -Item by Response Patterna

Item No.

1.

3.

5.

7.

1.

A+
C-

8+ A+
C- B-

B+ C+
A- B-

C+
A-

2.

A+
C-

B+ A+
C- B-

B+ C+
A- 8-

C+
A-

3.

C+
A-

B+ C+
A- B-

B+ A+
C- B-

A+
C-

4.

A+
8-

C+ A+
8- C-

C+ B+
A- C-

B+
A-

5.

A+
B-

C+ A+
B- C-

C+ 8+
A- C-

B+
A-

6.

A+
C-

8+ A+
C- .B-

8+ C+
A- B-

C+
A-

7

B+
A-

C+ B+
A- C-

C+ A+
B- C-

A+
B-

8.

C+
B-

A+ C+
B- A-

A+ B+
C- A-

B+
C-

9.

C+
B-

A+ C+
B- A-

A+ B+
C- A-

B+
C-

10.

A+
B-

C+ A+
B- C-

C+ B+
A- C-

B+
A-

11.

A+
B-

C+ A+
B- C-

C+ B+
A- C-

B+
A-

12.

C+
B-

A+ C+
B- A-

A+ B+
C- A-

B+
C-

13.

C+
A-

B+ C+
A- B-

B+ A+
C- B-

A+
C-

14.

B+
C-

A+ B+
C- A-

A+ C+
B- A-

C+
B-

I

•

91
Item No.

1.

3.

5.

7.

15

C+
B-

A+ C+
B- A-

A+ B+
C- A-

B+
C-

16

C+
B-

A+ C+
B- A-

A+ B+
C- A-

B+
C-

17.

A+
C-

B+ A+
C- B-

B+ C+
A- B-

C+
A-

18.

C+
A-

B+ C+
A- B-

B+ A+
C- B-

A+
C-

19.

B+
C-

A+ B+
C- A-

A+ C+
8- A-

C+
B-

20

A+
B-

C+ A+
B- C-

C+ 8+
A- C-

B+
A-

aSum for all 20 items and add constant of 20.

Range: 40 - 160

Forced choice Mach V. (Christie and Geis 1970, p. 31-32)
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In each of the 2 categories please mark over the prefix letter with
an X if it is most like yourself (compared to the other two choices),
and mark over the prefix letter with an 0 the item least like yourself, leave the one remaining prefix letter blank.
Age - Male
Birth rank in family
of
Grade Point Average - - - Social Security Number _ _ __
Date of this administration
Location of administration
1.

A.
B.
C.

2.

A.
B.
C.

3.

A.
B.
C.

4.

A.
B.
C.

It takes more imagination to be a successful criminal than
a successful business man.
The phrase, "the road to hell is paved with good intentions"
contains a lot of truth.
Mo~t men forget more easily the death of their father than
the loss of their property.
Men are more concerned with the car they drive than with
the clothes their wives wear.
It is very important that imagination and creativity in
children be cultivated.
People suffering from incurable diseases should have the
choice of being put painlessly to death.
Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless
it is useful to do so.
The well-being of the individual is the goal that should
be worked for before anything else.
Since mose people don't know what they want, it is only
reasonable for ambitious people to talk them into doing
things.
People are getting so lazy and self-indulgent that it is
bad for our country.
The best way to handle people is to tell them what they
want to hear.
It would be a good thing if people were kinder to others
less fortunate than themselves.
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5.

A.
B.
C.

6.

A.
B.
C.

7.

A.
B.
C.

8. ·A.
B.
C.
9.

A.
B.
C.

10.

A.
B.
C.

11.

A.
B.
C.

Most people are basically good and kind.
The best criteria -for a wife or husband is compatabilityother characteristics are nice but not essential.
Only after a man has gottn what he wants from life should
he concern himself with the injustices in the world.
Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral
lives.
Any man worth his salt shouldn•t be blamed for putting
his career above his family.
People would be better off if they were concerned less
with how to do things and more with what to do.
A good teacher is one who points out unanswered questions
rather than gives explicit answers.
When you ask someone to do something, it is best to give
the real reason for wanting it rather than giving reasons
which might carry more weight.
A person•s job is the best single guide as to the sort of
person he is.
The construction of such monumental works as the Egyptian
pyramids was worth the enslavement of the workers who built
them.
Once a way of handling problems has been worked out it is
best to stick to it.
One should take action only when sure tt is morally right.
The world would be a much better place to live in if people
would let the future take care of itself and concern themselves only with enjoying the present.
It is wise to flatter important people.
Once a decision has been made, it is best to keep changing
it as new circumstances arise.
It is a good policy to act as if you are doing the things
you do because you have no other choice.
The biggest difference between most criminals and other
people is that criminals are stupid enough to get caught.
Even the most hardened and vicious criminal has a spark
of decency somewhere within him.
All in all, it is better to be humble and . honest than to
be important and dishonest.
A man who is able and willing to work hard has a good chance
of succeeding in whatever he wants to do.
If a thing does not help us in our daily 11ves, it isn•t
very important.
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12.

A.
B.
C.

13.

A.
B.
C.

14.

A.
B.
C.

15.

A.
B.
C.

16.

A.

A person shouldn't be punished for breaking a law that .
he · thinks is -- unreasonable.
Too many ciminals are not punished for their crimes.
There is no excuse for lying to someone else.
Generally speaking, men son't work hard unless they are
forced to do so.
Every person is entitled to a second chance, even after he
commits a serious mistake.
People who can't make up their minds are not worth
bothering about.
A man's first responsibility is to his wife, not his
mother.
Most men are brave.
It's best to pick friends that are intellectually
stimulating rather than ones it is comfortable to be
around.
There are very few people in the world worth concerning
oneself about.
It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and
there.
A capable person motivated for his own gain is more useful
to society than a well-meaning but ineffective one.

C.

It is best to give others the impression that you can change
your mind easily.
It is a good working policy to keep on good terms with
,
everyone.
Honesty is the best policy in all cases.

17.

A.
B.
C.

It is possible to be good in all respects.
To help oneself is good; to help others even better.
War and threats of war are unchangeable facts of human life.

18.

A.

Barnum was probably right when he said that there's at
least one sucker born every minute.
Life is pretty dull unless one deliberately stirs up some
excitement.
Most people would be better off it they control their
emotions.

B.

B.
C.
19.

A.
B.
C.

Sensitivity to the feelings of others is worth more than
poise in social situations.
The ideal society is one where everybody knows his place
and accepts it.
It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak
and it will come out when they are given a chance.
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20.

A.
B.
C.

People who talk about abstract problems usually don't
know what they- are talking about.
Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for
trouble.
It is essential for the functioning of a democracy that
everyone vote.

APPENDIX B
For each of the 20 items please mark in the space provided, the
extent ( VSD_SD_D_N_A_SA_VSA_ as explained below) to
which you agree with the statement. Very Strongly Disagree (VSD),
Strongly Disagree (SO), Disagree (D), Neutral (N), Agree (A),
Strongly Agree (SA), Very strongly Agree (VSA).
Age - - Male Female Birth rank in family
of
Grade Point Average - - Social Security Number _ _ __
Date of administration
Location of adminstration
SCORED:
+

1. The best way to handle people is to tel l them what they
want to hear. VSD SO 0 N A SA VSA

+

2. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best
to give the real reasons for wanting it rat her than giving
reasons which might carry more weight.
VSD SO 0 N A SA VSA

+

3. Anyone who completely trust anyone else is asking for
trouble. VSD SO 0 N A SA VSA

+

4. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here
and there. VSD_SD_D_N_A_SA_VSA
5. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.
VSA-SO- 0-N-A-SA-VSA

+
+

6. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious
streak and it will come out when they are given a chance.
VSA-SO- 0-N-A-SA-VSA
7. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something
unless it is useful to do so. VSD_~D_O_N_A_S A_V S A
8. One should take action only when sure it i s moral ly
right. vso_so_o_N_A_SA_vsA
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SCORED:
+

9. It is wise to flatter important people.
VSO-SO- 0-- --N--A-SA-VSA
10. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than
important and dishonest. VSO_SO_O_N_A_SA_VSA
11. Barnum was very wrong when he said "There's a sucker
born every minute." VSO_SO_O_N_A_SA_VSA

+

12. People suffering from incurable diseases should have
the choice of being put painlessly to death.
VSO SO 0 N A SA VSA
13.
VSO

It is possible to be good in all respects.
SO 0 N A SA VSA

14. Most people are basically good and kind.
VSO SO 0 N A SA VSA
15. There is no excuse for lying to someone
VSO . SO 0 N A SA VSA

+

16. Most men forget the death of their father more easily
than the loss of their property.
VSD SO 0 N A SA VSA

+

17. Generally speaking, men won't work hard unless they
are forced to do so. VSD_SD_D_N_A_SA_VSA
18. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean,
moral lives. VSD_SO_O_N_A_SA_VSA

+

19. The biggest difference between most criminals and
other people is that criminals are stupid enough to get
caught.
VSD_SD_O_N_A_SA_VSA
20.

Most men are brave.

VSD-SO- 0-N-A-SA-VSA
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